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3Abstract
My thesis consists of three chapters. The aim of the first two chapters is to
investigate the linkages between trade and the cross-country comovement and
volatility of GDP growth, while the last chapter is an independent study on
how the optimal design of monetary policy depends on the share of labour- and
capital-intensive sectors.
The first chapter develops a framework to study the effects of international
trade on GDP comovement. Using a standard trade-theoretical approach, I first
show how the comovement between any pair of countries is linked to shocks
affecting both the two countries bilaterally and all other countries. Secondly, I
use a calibrated version of the model to assess the importance of the bilateral
channel relative to the role of linkages with all other countries.
The second chapter investigates whether and how openness to trade may
affect macroeconomic volatility. While greater openness provides a powerful
channel for transmission of foreign disturbances, it also lowers the exposure to
domestic shocks. My co-authors and I show that as long as the volatility of
trading partners and covariance of shocks across countries are not too large,
trade can act as a channel for the diversification of country-specific shocks and
in that way contribute to lower volatility.
The third chapter examines what is the optimal measure of inflation in a
two-sector economy with nominal frictions, where sectors differ in labour inten-
sity. I find that a welfare-oriented central bank should follow more closely the
developments in the less labour-intensive sector. The source of this bias is traced
back to a greater sensitivity of the marginal product of labour in that sector, so
that output dispersion caused by nominal rigidities generates higher efficiency
losses where labour is relatively less abundant.
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1Trade and Comovement
1.1 Introduction
Does trade enhance comovement? This question naturally arises when looking
back at the long synchronised upswings and several downswings posted by most
developed economies since the beginning of 1990s. For almost simultaneously,
the world has been experiencing an unprecedented expansion of global trade, on
the back of the increased integration of China, South-East Asia and, somewhat
later, Central and Eastern Europe in global production chains. While the jury
is still out on whether and in which sense exactly have business cycles become
more correlated1, it is a well established fact that global merchandise trade grew
almost three times as fast as global GDP from the 1960’s and even faster in the
past twenty or thirty years, until the current crisis.
We look at the relationship between across-the-border trade in goods and
comovement in real GDP growth through the lens of a standard general equi-
librium framework that conceptualises the demand and supply linkages among
countries. The model is a variant of Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Alvarez
1See, for instance, Cerqueira and Martins (2009) or Bower and Guillemineau (2006) for
an affirmative answer, or Heathcote and Perri (2004) and Doyle and Faust (2002) for a more
cautious view. Kose, Otrok and Prasad (2012) coin the phrase ‘decoupling’ for the observed
decrease in business cycle correlations between the blocks of industrial and emerging countries
but convergence within each block.
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and Lucas (2007) with stochastic country-specific shocks and pair-specific trade
shocks. With this model, we set out to investigate whether greater openness to
trade affects cross-country correlations and, if so, to examine what determines
whether two countries’ growth rates will be positively correlated.
The relationship between trade and comovement has been the topic of several
theoretical and a long list of empirical studies. To exemplify the former stream
of literature, Kose and Yi (2006) study the implications of trade on comovement
within a canonical international business cycle model. They conclude, on the
basis of empirical work of their own and others, that a standard version of the
model fails to replicate the patterns they see in data, for which they coin the
term trade-comovement puzzle. In an attempt to resolve the puzzle, Arkolakis
and Ramanarayanan (2009) use a framework similar to ours but augmented for
vertical specialisation to show that experiments with trade intensity can generate
moderate increases in cross-country comovement.
Clearly, multi-country macroeconomic models have predictions about the re-
lationship between trade and comovement so it would be desirable to have a
corresponding ‘stylized fact’ to provide a testing ground for competing theories.
A large body of empirical work has already been devoted to the study of effects
of trade on comovement, and this is the main stream of literature to which our
results speak to. The seminal paper in this field is Frankel and Rose (1998),
who estimate regressions of the following form
Corr(yˆiτ , yˆjτ ) = α + β Tradeijτ + ijτ
where yˆ denotes a measure of fluctuations in economic activity in period τ and
Tradeijτ is a measure of trade intensity between countries i and j in the same
period. Their estimation uses instrumental variables to control for a bias that
arises, as they argue, because countries are likely to stabilise their exchange
rates with respect to their main trading partners. The instruments they use are
exogenous bilateral characteristics that capture the distance of the two countries,
existence of a common border etc. Other studies using a similar estimation
framework include Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005), Calderon, Chong and Stein
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(2007) and others.2 Our reading of the literature is that it typically seeks for
measures and/or estimation techniques that would capture omitted variables –
bilaterally relevant for i and j – that they consider important in driving the bias
in the equation above.
To preview our results, we derive closed-form formulas for bilateral correla-
tions consistent with our model and find that direct trade between i and j does
expose country i to shocks that affect its trade partner j, buttressing thus their
comovement. So far, this is consistent with the estimation strategies above.
However, we also find that the direct trade empirically accounts for less than
10% of the observed comovement. What matters more, according to our model,
is that country i trades with one or more other countries k. Then, if k tends
to receive similar shocks as j, countries i and j are likely to post high bilateral
correlations – independently of whether they trade with each other or not. This
‘indirect-trade’ effect, as we call it, accounts for the bulk of observed correla-
tions, because the relative strength of the ‘direct’ trade exposure to j is typically
substantially smaller than the exposure to all other trade partners. To relate
this finding to the above empirical works, our results support the search for
identification strategies that control for the exposure to coincident shocks, for
instance through the similarity of the industrial structure. However, our results
also suggest that the search should focus on the similarity between i’s other trade
partners and j, and vice versa, between j’s other trade partners and i, rather
than on the similarity between i and j bilaterally.
2Calderon, Chong and Stein (2007) and also Gruben, Koo, Millis (2002) base their regres-
sions on intra-industry trade to capture the role of industry-specific shocks. Also Fidrmuc
(2001) provides evidence that using the total volume of trade is misguided and confine the
role of trade in transmitting shocks to intra-industry trade only. Other relevant works include
Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003), Clark and van Wincoop (2001), Otto, Voss and Willard
(2001), Anderson, Kwark and Vahid (1999).
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1.2 Model
The model we use here, as well as in Chapter 2, is a version of Eaton-Kortum
(2002) and Alvarez-Lucas (2007)’s model with stochastic parameters. Adhering,
where possible, to their original notation, the model can be described as follows.
Let us assume that there is a continuum of goods ω ∈ [0, 1] that can be
produced in all n countries in the model at costs (x1, x2, . . ., xn). Given this
mapping between goods ω and cost combinations x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn), the model
can, without loss of generality, be cast in terms of the cost combinations x. Let
ϕi(xi) be the density in country i of cost draw xi (where i here denotes the i
th
element of x). Assuming it is exponentially distributed with parameters λi, the
density of x is
ϕ(x) =
n∏
i=1
ϕi (xi) =
n∏
i=1
λie
−λixi
Parameter λi will play a crucial role in our model; let us therefore state here
that higher λi increases the density of lower cost draws, which amounts to a
positive productivity shock.
Let qf,i(x) denote the per-capita quantity of individual goods x that are
bought by consumers for final consumption, and let qf,i denote the bundle of all
goods that enters utility
qf,i =
(∫ ∞
0
qf,i (x)
η−1
η ϕ(x)dx
) η
η−1
Assuming utility is linear in qf,i and taking domestic prices of good x, pi(x),
as given (there is perfect competition in all markets), cost minimisation implies
the following demand functions and price index:
qf,i (x) =
(
pi
pi (x)
)η
qf,i
pi =
(∫ ∞
0
pi (x)
1−η ϕ (x) dx
) 1
1−η
(1.1)
Let individual purchases of goods qi (xi) be produced in i using equipped
labour, of which there is Li in total, and all other goods bundled together in the
same CES aggregator as given above. We assume that any individual good can
be either directly consumed or used as an intermediate input.
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The production function is Cobb-Douglas with β, the share of the unproduced
input, being common across countries.
qi (xi) = xi
−θLi(xi)
β qm,i (xi)
1−β
where qm,i (xi) denotes the quantity of the bundle of intermediate goods that it
takes to produce a good with cost level xi. Notice that cost shocks enter the
production function as a productivity parameter xi
−θ and recall that shocks are
exponentially distributed. As explained in Eaton and Kortum (2002), the trans-
formation xi
−θ makes productivity shocks distributed according to the Frechet
distribution, where θ governs the variance of shocks. With higher θ, productivity
shocks become more volatile.
Perfect competition and constant returns imply that the price of each in-
dividual intermediate good potentially produced in the domestic economy at
productivity xi
−θ would be
pi(xi) = Bx
θ
iw
β
i p
1−β
i
where constant B = ββ(1 − β)1−β and wi is the pay of the unproduced input.
When producers have the choice of importing intermediates from abroad, each
good x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) will be priced at the level of the cheapest supplier
pi (x) = Bmin
j
(
xj
θwj
βpj
1−β
κij
)
where 1/κ represents physical trade costs. For one unit to arrive from j to i,
1/κij must be shipped and paid for. We assume 0 < κ ≤ 1 and that it is always
cheaper to transport goods directly than through a third country (κij ≥ κikκkj).
Domestic trade is costless, κii = 1 and we further assume that there are no
money tariffs.
Given that domestic prices of goods x are a function of stochastic vector x, it
is possible to work out the price index pi as given by (1.1). Using the properties
of the Frechet distribution (following Eaton and Kortum, 2002), we have
pi = AB
(
n∑
j=1
(
wj
βpj
1−β
κij
)− 1
θ
λj
)−θ
(1.2)
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which is a set of non-linear equations solvable for p as a function of vector w.
Constant A is defined as A = Γ (1 + θ (1− η)) 11−η , which implies a parameter
restriction θ ≤ 1/(η − 1), assuming η > 1).
With a continuum of goods x, the fraction of goods that will be purchased
in i from country j is given by the probability that, for each good x country j
is the minimum-price supplier in country i. Denoting this fraction dij, we have
dij = Prob
(
Bxj
θwj
βpj
1−β
κij
≤ mink
(
Bxk
θwk
βpk
1−β
κik
))
for each k 6= j. Exploiting the properties of Frechet distribution further, one
can show that this is
dij = (AB)
− 1
θ
(
wβj p
1−β
j
/
κij
)− 1
θ
λj∑n
k=1
(
wβkp
1−β
k
/
κik
)− 1
θ
λk
Notice that with prices being functions of the wage of the unproduced input, dij
becomes also a function of wages.
Across-the-border linkages are constrained in the model by imposing that
spending on goods (which are all potentially tradable) in country i, Lipiqi, is
equal to total spending of all countries (including i itself) on goods produced
in i. Each country spends fraction dji of Ljpjqj on goods produced in i. With
eventual imbalances captured by Si, we have
Lipiqi + Si =
n∑
j=1
Ljpjqjdji (1.3)
With exogenous Li and Si, and prices and trade shares determined by wages,
as shown above, this equation implies that per-capita spending qi can also be
determined as a function of wages.
Domestically, the model is closed by imposing, first, the national accounting
identity that states that total income of labour must be equal to total final
expenditure: Liwi = Lipiqf,i+Si, which determines total spending of households
on final goods Lipiqf,i. Furthermore, the Cobb-Douglas production function
stated above implies that the fraction of each good used as an intermediate input
is qm,i(x) = (1−β)qi(x). Multiplying both sides by Lipi(x) and integrating over
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x, the right-hand side gives total spending of firms on intermediate goods, which
can be also written as a fraction of total spending in the economy (incl. from
abroad): (1−β)(Lipiqi +Si). Adding the expenditure on final and intermediate
goods and making them equal to total expenditure on goods Lipiqi, gives the
relationship
Liwi = β(Lipiqi + Si) (1.4)
which completes the description of the model and can be used to determine the
remaining endogenous variable in the model (wages).
For ease of notation, let us make the following substitutions. First, let us
denote Zi the following transformation of the aggregate productivity parameter
λi:
Zi ≡ L
β
θ
i λi
and denote Lwi = Liwi. What we gain by these transformations is that we
avoid the need to work with parameter Li, that does not have a self-evident
counterpart in data (recall that Li is the unproduced input in the economy
– equipped labour – rather than a simple head count). Lwi, instead, is total
income of the factor, which can be easily mapped to national accounts.
Using this notation, we can now collect the key equations. Substituting
from (1.4) for Lipiqi and ignoring trade imbalances, as we do in all subsequent
derivations, the trade identity (1.3) is:
Lwi =
n∑
j=1
Lwjdji (1.5)
which jointly with the definition of dij with our transformed variables
dij = (AB)
− 1
θ
(
Lwβj p
1−β
j
/
κij
)− 1
θ
Zj∑n
k=1
(
Lwβkp
1−β
k
/
κik
)− 1
θ
Zk
(1.6)
gives a set of equations in prices and aggregate nominal income only. Rewriting
the price equation (1.2) with the new notation, it also becomes a function of
prices and aggregate income. Jointly, these two form a set of 2n equations in
2n variables: aggregate nominal income Lwi and its price level pi. As shown in
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Appendix 1.A.1, trade identities (1.3) are not linearly independent, so we will
be able to solve only for relative prices subject to a numeraire. The key rela-
tionships, which are used to solved the model, for both algebraic and numerical
purposes, then are
Lwi =
n∑
j=1
Lwj
(
Lwβi p
1−β
i
/
κji
)− 1
θ
Zi∑n
k=1
(
Lwβkp
1−β
k
/
κjk
)− 1
θ
Zk
pi = AB
(
n∑
k=1
(
Lwβkp
1−β
k
/
κik
)− 1
θ
Zk
)−θ
1.2.1 Closed-form solution
The model has a closed-form solution only in the special cases of autarky and
zero trade costs. While these are useful to understand the basic relationship
between trade and comovement, they are not helpful in terms of pointing at the
key channels through which trade impacts comovement in the data. As we show
in section 1.4.1, trade costs are far away from the free-trade assumption among
most countries. We therefore proceed to log-linearise the model and describe its
solution in terms of log-deviations of shocks around their steady-state values. By
doing so, we are able to derive an insightful closed-form solution for covariances
and eventually also for correlations between GDP growth rates.
We seek a solution in terms of real GDP Yi = Lwi/pi, let us therefore trans-
form the last two equations from the previous section once again, to obtain
relationships in terms of Yi and pi:
Yi pi =
n∑
j=1
Yj pj
(
Y βi pi
/
κji
)− 1
θ
Zi∑n
k=1
(
Y βk pk
/
κjk
)− 1
θ
Zk
(1.7)
pi = AB
(
n∑
k=1
(
Y βk pk
/
κik
)− 1
θ
Zk
)−θ
(1.8)
Log-linearising both equations and using steady-state trade shares dij as de-
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fined in (1.6), we obtain the following relationships3:
Y i pi (yˆi + pˆi) =
n∑
j=1
Y j pj dji(
yˆj + pˆj − βyˆi + pˆi − κˆji
θ
+ zˆi −
n∑
k=1
djk
(
−βyˆk + pˆk − κˆjk
θ
+ zˆk
))
pˆi =
n∑
k=1
dik (βyˆk + pˆk − κˆik − θzˆk)
Notice that the latter equation implicitly defines a weighted average of relative
prices
∑n
k=1 dik (pˆk − pˆi), which could help us eliminate relative prices from the
former equation. However, there is an important caveat. For each country i, all
terms in the price equation are summed over k, which is the second subscript
in dik, while the first summation in the trade identity above is over the first
subscript of dji. Nevertheless, there is a useful relationship that will allow us to
proceed with solving both log-linearised equations simultaneously. Namely, let
us impose
Lwidij = Lwjdji or, equivalently Yi pi dij = Yj pj dji (1.9)
which states that the value of goods produced by country j used in country i’s
production equals the value of goods produced by i used in j’s output.
The relationship follows from the assumption of symmetric trade costs: κij =
κji, which is also the cornerstone of the strategy we follow to identify trade costs
from data; see section 1.4.1 below. Let us explain why (1.9) holds because it
is not straightforward. Notice that without making any assumptions on trade
costs κ, trade shares (1.6) can be used to write
dij
dji
djk
dkj
=
(
Lwβj p
2−β
j κji
Lwβi p
2−β
i κij
)− 1
θ
Zj
Zi
(
Lwβkp
2−β
k κkj
Lwβj p
2−β
j κjk
)− 1
θ
Zk
Zj
Now, assuming symmetry, κij = κji and κjk = κkj gives
dij
dji
djk
dkj
=
(
Lwβkp
2−β
k
Lwβi p
2−β
i
)− 1
θ
Zk
Zi
3In what follows, variables with a bar denote steady-state values, while a hat indicates a
log-deviation from the steady state.
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which, for κik = κki, equals dik/dki. We therefore obtain the relationship
dijdjk
djidkj
=
dik
dki
which can be arbitrarily expanded, as long the number of countries allows, ac-
cording to the following the pattern. Note that country labels a, b, etc. can
represent any country; what matters is that the circular link d∗f df∗ between
any two countries is obeyed.
dab dbc dc∗ . . . d∗y dyz
dba dcb d∗c . . . dy∗ dzy
=
daz
dza
This powerful condition says that the share of country z goods in a’s output
relative to the share of a’s goods in z’s output holds for trade that takes place
directly between a and z, the right-hand side of the expression, as well as for
the relative contents of goods in any other country’s (or countries’) exports to
the pair, i.e. the left-hand side. If, for instance, trade costs and the country-
specific shocks are such that country z’s share in a’s output is five times larger
than a’s share in z’s output, the content of z’s good in a’s imports from a third
country j will be also five times larger than the content of a’s goods in z’ exports
from j. This is because costs of trade via j: κajκjz and κzjκja, are identical for
both countries. When trade costs are symmetric, there is no reason why the
relative shares of goods traded directly or indirectly should differ. Naturally,
the amount of goods traded between both countries directly and indirectly, via
output of other countries, will be very different, depending on how costly trade
with j is for both countries and how big j is (both relative to all other countries).
What ever parameter values drive the fact that a’s and z’s goods account for
the relative share daz
dza
in each other’s production, given the universal symmetry
and zero trade imbalances, the same drivers will then substantiate that z’s nom-
inal output will be daz
dza
times larger than that of a. Notice that equation (1.9) is
stricter than the trade identity (1.5) but it is consistent with it (to see it, sum
over j, making use of
∑n
j=1 dij = 1). Mathematically, the derivation of (1.9)
uses (n − 1) independent equations from the trade identity (1.5), successively
eliminating trade shares of other countries.
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Having established that Yi pi dij = Yj pj dji, our log-linearised model becomes
yˆi + pˆi =
n∑
j=1
dij
(
yˆj + pˆj − βyˆi + pˆi − κˆji
θ
+ zˆi −
n∑
k=1
djk
(
−βyˆk + pˆk − κˆjk
θ
+ zˆk
))
pˆi =
n∑
k=1
dik (βyˆk + pˆk − κˆik − θzˆk)
Substituting
∑n
k=1 dik (pˆk − pˆi) from the price equation to corresponding ex-
pressions in the trade equation and simple algebra then lead to the following
expression for GDP growth rates:
(β + θ) yˆi = θzˆi +
n∑
j=1
dij ((2 + θ) κˆij + (1 + θ) θzˆj) + (θ − β (1 + θ))
n∑
j=1
dij yˆj
(1.10)
where we separate the sums on the right-hand side to motivate the next step,
which is to solve the set of i linear equations above by means of matrix algebra.
Let us define the following matrices:
I . . . i x i identity matrix
y . . . i x 1 vector of yˆi
D . . . i x imatrix of dij
K . . . i x imatrix of κˆij
z . . . i x 1 vector of zˆi
With this notation, the equation becomes
(β + θ)
(
I− θ − β (1 + θ)
β + θ
D
)
y = (2 + θ)
n∑
j=1
(
d ◦ κˆ)
ij
+ θ (I + (1 + θ) D) z
where
(
d ◦ κˆ)
ij
stands for the ij element of the Hadamard (element-by-element)
product of dij and κˆij. For square matrices and symmetric K, the following
expression holds (Styan, 1973):
n∑
j=1
(
d ◦ κˆ)
ij
= (D K)ii
which states that the row-sum of an element-by-element product of two square
matrices equals the diagonal of their matrix product. Alternatively, the same
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result can be achieved by DL vec(K), where DL represents an n-by-n
2 matrix,
which is created by stacking n matrices each of the size of D next to each other
(row-wise), where the rth submatrix carries the rth row from the original matrix
D and has all other elements equal to zero. For illustration, for n = 3, it would
have the following shape
DL =

d11 d12 d13 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 d21 d22 d23 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 d31 d32 d33

The vec operator reshapes an n-by-n matrix into an n2-by-1 column vector.
Because of the symmetry in trade costs, we do not need to transpose matrix K
beforehand.
With these preliminary definitions, and denoting M(D) the invertible matrix
M(D) = I− θ − β (1 + θ)
β + θ
D
the solution to the log-linearised model is given by
y =
1
β + θ
M(D)−1
[
(2 + θ) (D K)ii + θ (I + (1 + θ) D) z
]
or alternatively
y =
1
β + θ
M(D)−1
[
(2 + θ) DL vec(K) + θ (I + (1 + θ) D) z
]
(1.11)
which defines the log-deviations of real GDP as a function of shocks that affect
bilateral trade costs and country-specific productivity. The expression is suf-
ficiently simple to derive the moments of real GDP growth rate based on the
properties of exogenous shocks. Notice the way shocks are transmitted across
countries – the strength of cross-country relationships is governed by the matrix
of steady-state trade-shares.
What can we say about the impact of shocks on GDP growth rates? Country
specific shocks zˆi affect GDP growth rates in two ways.
4 First, directly through
4Let us note that the individual channels we describe here are only hypothetical because, in
equilibrium, all of them will work simultaneously, reinforcing or counterbalancing each other.
We do so, nonetheless, in belief that this explanation will ease the understanding of the model.
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I z and secondly indirectly through (1 + θ) Dz. Recall that higher zˆi (a positive
productivity shock to i), on average, increases productivities of i’s individual
firms. Other things equal, other countries therefore end up purchasing a wider
range of goods from i, which makes i richer. This is where the direct effect
comes from. The indirect effect then reflects the role of relative prices on the
growth rate of i’s real GDP, where prices of i are always measured relative to
the weighted average of prices of all countries (weighted by the trade shares D).
They play a double role; first, they matter because nominal GDP is divided by
the price level and, secondly, they reinforce demand of other countries for i’s
goods. Regarding the latter, it carries weight θ because, in our model, higher θ
raises the variance of individual productivity draws, making higher productivity
shocks more likely.5.
Next, shocks to trade costs κ, say a positive shock that makes i’s goods
cheaper in other countries through higher κˆji, affect GDP in a similar way as
the country-specific shocks. First, there is the direct demand effect – all countries
buy more from i when trade costs are lower. Secondly, lower trade costs also
make i’s prices relatively cheaper, which again works through the (1 + θ) effect
described in the previous paragraph. Since trade costs are always relative, the
trade-share matrix D now premultiplies both terms. Should trade costs not be
symmetric, the former demand channel would depend on how costly it would be
for other countries to import goods from i (κˆji) while the relative-price channel
on i’s cost of importing goods from countries j (κˆij). However, trade costs are
symmetric in our model and therefore both effects are indistinguishable.
Finally, let us reflect on the role of the M(D) inverse in the solution. The pur-
pose of the (slightly cumbersome) notation we introduced above though which
we eliminated the coefficients at the identity matrix was to motivate the follow-
ing step. Namely, writing M as a difference I − cmD allows using the power
5The distribution of productivity shocks is positively skewed
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series expansion for approximating the inverse as follows6
(I− cmD)−1 '
∞∑
k=0
ckmD
k = I + cmD + c
2
mD
2 + . . .
Intuitively, what this operation does is that it takes into account the direct
impact of shocks described above (through the identity matrix) as well as the
indirect impact that carries through via trade. To see it, note that the ith
element of the product M(D)−1 z would be approximately equal to
zˆi + cm
n∑
a=1
diazˆa + c
2
m
n∑
a=1
n∑
b=1
dibdbazˆa + c
3
m
n∑
a=1
n∑
b=1
n∑
c=1
dicdcbdbazˆa + . . .
where the first element is the direct impact of own productivity shock; the second
element captures shocks to all countries a (including i itself) as carried through
trading with countries a; the third element captures the impact in i of country
a’s shocks on i’s direct trade partner b (where the degree with which it is felt in
i depends on i’s openness to b and b’s openness to a); the fourth element is again
the impact in i of a’s shocks on i’s direct trade partner c as transmitted through
c’s trade with b (where the impact depends on dicdcbdba), etc. etc. The inverse
therefore takes care of transmitting the shocks via both direct- and indirect-
trade channels so that all shocks are felt in each country via all thinkable trade
relationships that exist in the equilibrium.
Before we proceed further, we briefly note that the solution can be easily
specialised for the extreme cases of autarky and cost-less trade. In autarky,
trade shares D is an identity matrix and trade costs K are zero. Therefore
matrix M becomes a constant (2 + θ) β/ (β + θ) and yAut = θ
β
z or yˆAuti =
θ
β
zˆi.
Of course, when countries are closed and the only source of volatility are own
productivity shocks, GDP growth mimics the behaviour of these shocks. A
corresponding formula with costless trade, realising that dkij are still zero, is
6The infinite sum converges. Note that cm can be alternatively written as − θ(β−1)+βθ+β , which
makes it clear that |cm| < 1 because β, the share of the intermediate input in production, is
always 0 < β < 1. Furthermore, D is a matrix of trade shares (all elements between zero and
one), which become smaller after successive multiplications. In the extreme case of autarky,
D is an identity matrix, for which the sum converges because |cm| < 1.
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the following:
yF =
θ
β + θ
M
(
DF
)−1 [
z + (1 + θ) DFz
]
Without matrices, the same relationship derived from (1.10) would be
yˆFi =
θ
β + θ
zˆi +
(1 + θ) θ
β + θ
n∑
j=1
d∗j zˆj +
θ − β (1 + θ)
β + θ
n∑
j=1
d∗j yˆFj
where the notation d∗j for an element in the jth column of DF refers to the fact
that with κFij = 1 and equal prices everywhere (because of free trade), dij does
not depend on i any longer, i.e. all countries import the same fraction of goods
from j. Notice that the last term is common for all countries and functions as a
common scaling constant, amplifying or moderating the response of all countries
to shocks. We conclude that the dynamics of GDP growth with cost-less trade is
determined not only by own productivity shocks zˆi, as was the case in autarky,
but also by other countries’ productivity shocks, transmitted through trade.7
1.3 Sources of comovement
The point of this section is to investigate the mechanics of the model and study
how trade linkages across countries induce comovement. We start with stating
the general formula for covariance between yˆi and yˆj. Subsequently, we make
several simplifying assumptions that allow us to derive an approximate, yet
tractable closed-form solution for correlations between GDP growth rates of
any two countries. Finally, we present several illustrations that document how
various linkages in the model drive comovement.
7This formula is, in principle, identical to the equation (2.6) we arrive at in Chapter 2. The
only difference concerns the constant before the second term on the right-hand side, which
is due to a different choice of the numeraire. Unlike here, the price level (recall that prices
are equal across countries with free trade) defined in Chapter 2 by (2.4) is a function of all
productivity parameters Zi, which gives rise to the difference in constants.
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Let us start with solution (1.11) we obtained in the previous section. The
covariance matrix of y, Cov(y) = E
(
yyT
)
,8 is given by the following expression
Cov(y) =
1
(β + θ)2
M(D)−1
[
(2 + θ)2 DL E
(
vec(K) vec(K)T
)
DL
T
+ θ (2 + θ) DL E
(
vec(K) zT
)(
I + (1 + θ) DT
)
(1.12)
+ θ (2 + θ)
(
I + (1 + θ) D
)
E
(
z vec(K)T
)
DL
T
+ θ2
(
I + (1 + θ) D
)
E
(
z zT
) (
I + (1 + θ) DT
)] (
M(D)−1
)T
which relates covariances of GDP growth rates to covariances of trade shocks,
covariances of country-specific shocks and their cross-covariances.
1.3.1 Trade and country-specific shocks
For the sake of clarity, let us now abstract from any volatility in trade costs
and focus instead on how country-specific shocks are transmitted through trade.
While trade shocks, as we document in section 1.4.1, play an important role
in cross-country comovement, we are more interested in the role of trade as a
channel for transmission of country-specific (or aggregate) shocks, to which the
trade shocks add an additional layer of disturbances. Under the assumption of
fixed trade costs and a general covariance matrix of zˆ, which we label Ωz, the
formula above collapses to
Cov(y) =
θ2
(β + θ)2
M(D)−1
[(
I + (1 + θ) D
)
Ωz
(
I + (1 + θ) DT
)] (
M(D)−1
)T
Notice that in autarky9, this is equal to θ
2
β2
Ωz, which is consistent with our
solution for yˆAuti =
θ
β
zˆi. Clearly, with no covariance in underlying shocks, there
is no mechanism in the model that would make growth rates correlated.
More interestingly, this formula shows that even if shocks are uncorrelated,
trade induces non-zero cross-covariances.10 We illustrate below in detail what
8Log-deviations from steady-state values have zero mean.
9Matrix D is an identity matrix and therefore M = β(2+θ)β+θ .
10Replace Ωz with an identity matrix to see that the off-diagonal elements of the covariance
matrix are nonzero. Notice that we cannot conclude that the changes in covariances induced
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gives rise to non-zero covariances and whether they also translate in non-zero
correlations in several specific environments but the general point is that trade
exposes each country to shocks that affect its trade partners and possibly also
other countries, not directly connected through trade, which may however tend
to receive similar shocks as one of the direct trade partners.
To make our point and illustrate how trade generates comovement, let us
write the formula above in a more intuitive way. Expanding the terms inside of
the brackets, we have[
. . .
]
= Ωz + (1 + θ) ΩzD
T + (1 + θ) DΩz + (1 + θ)
2 DΩzD
T
Next, approximation of the inverses as shown in the previous section gives
Cov(y) ' θ
2
(β + θ)2
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
l=0
ck+lm D
k
[
. . .
] (
Dl
)T
' θ
2
(β + θ)2
[
Ωz + (1 + cm + θ)
(
DΩz + ΩzD
T
)
(1.13)
+ (1 + cm + θ)
2 DΩzD
T + cm (1 + cm + θ)
(
D2Ωz + Ωz
(
DT
)2 )
+ . . .
]
As said, successive multiplications by D represent the pass-through of shocks
via trade partners of trade partners etc. With realistic values of D, the off-
diagonal elements are typically of the order of 1/100, hence their cross-products
have a minimal effect on the final outcome, compared to the first-order terms.
Let us therefore abstract from the second- and higher order terms and deliver
the intuition with a simplified version of the function. A comparison of the
effects we obtain in this way with the results generated with a full version of the
formula presented in the following section confirms that the loss of generality
makes only little difference to the key results.
by trade will be positive for all parameter values and trade shares. While all elements within
the square brackets are by definition positive when Ωz is an identity matrix, the same cannot
be said about the inverse that pre- and post-multiplies the bracket. Matrix M(D) is defined
as I − cmD, where cm = θ−β(1+θ)β+θ can be positive or negative. Its inverse can have both
positive and negative elements. Note that even positive definiteness of matrix M, which could
be guaranteed under certain parameter restrictions, would not necessarily result in positive
elements in the covariance matrix.
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The first-order terms in the covariance matrix are given by the middle line
in (1.13). The ijth element of the matrix is
Cov(yˆi, yˆj) ' θ
2
(β + θ)2
[
ωij + (1 + cm + θ)
( n∑
k=1
dik ωkj +
n∑
k=1
djk ωik
)]
where ωij is the ij element of Ωz, i.e. covariance between countries i and j’s
shocks. Denoting the constant
cd = 1 + cm + θ = 1 +
θ − β (1 + θ)
β + θ
+ θ =
θ (2 + θ)
β + θ
and extracting relevant covariances from the sums, we have
Cov(yˆi, yˆj) ' θ
2
(β + θ)2
{(
1 + cd
(
dii + djj
) )
ωij
+ cd
(
dij ωjj + dji ωii
)
+ cd
∑
k 6=i,j
(
dik ωkj + djk ωik
)}
What does the formula tell about the (first-order) effects of trade on covari-
ances? The way we wrote it suggests there are three factors to consider; with the
first and second one closely related because they concern the bilateral character-
istics of i and j. The first term reflects how the underlying covariance between i
and j’s shocks decreases when countries open to trade; dii reaches maximum in
autarky and falls as country i starts trading with other countries (trade shares
sum to 1). Therefore, as both countries become more open, the less it matters
how the underlying i − j shocks comove and the greater is the importance of
the other terms in the formula. Notice that the term would decrease also if the
two countries trade only with each other. Then, and this is the second term
in the formula, their covariance would increasingly capture the pass-through of
each others’ shocks (ωjj stands for variance of j’s shocks). If i and j trade only
with each other and are equally volatile, this term would dominate the first one
because variances ωii are larger than covariances ωij.
What if trade costs (and other parameters) are such that there is no direct
trade between i and j but both i and j trade with other countries? Then
1. TRADE AND COMOVEMENT 29
covariance between i and j’s growth would become increasingly determined by
the last factor in the formula, which describes how exposed country i is – through
trade linkages dik – to shocks that tend to affect (assuming ωik > 0) both i’s
trade partners and j; and vice versa, how exposed j is – through shares djk
– to shocks that affect j’s trade partners and i. Together, these are weighted
covariances between own trade partners and the other country in the pair. The
term will rise when, say, country i trades with countries, whose shocks comove
with j. Notice that it does not require that j also trades with these countries,
it only considers their underlying covariances. In other words, covariance of
GDP growth between i and j depends on how j comoves with countries i trades
with and vice versa. If j tends to get similar shocks as a third country m, then
through i’s exposure to m the shocks i implicitly gets are those that affect j as
well.
This result sheds light on the specification strategy for an empirical investi-
gation of trade and comovement. As discussed in the introductory part of the
chapter, the typical approach is to relate a measure of comovement between a
pair of countries to a set of bilateral characteristics, including a measure bilateral
trade intensity. The model, however, suggests that there is a need for controlling
for the underlying covariances among all countries one of the pair trades with,
for otherwise the last term in the equation above generates a systematic ‘error’
in the association of trade between two countries and their comovement. This
error arises because the covariance between i and j’s growth is systematically
affected by each of the countries’ trade with others that comove with its coun-
terpart in the pair. The strength of this link is pair-specific and therefore it will
not be treated with country-specific dummies. We will inspect the quantitative
significance of this channel in the empirical part of this chapter.
Until now, we have described the channels through which covariances are
affected by trade in our model. By doing so, we have implicitly assumed that
trade has no effect on countries’ volatility, which meant that covariances were
directly comparable. However, we show in detail in Chapter 2 that trade can
decrease or increase variances, depending on the particular characteristics of a
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country’s trade partners so the changes in covariances induced by trade could,
in principle, be amplified or counterbalanced by the effect of trade on volatility.
Let us now therefore extend the analysis to a more general case and see what
would be the impact of trade on correlations – a dimensionless measure of linear
comovement. The results described so far remain relevant because correlations
are covariances scaled by the product of standard deviations.
Variance of i’s GDP growth in our model is as follows
V ar(yˆi) = Cov(yˆi, yˆi) ' θ
2
(β + θ)2
{
ωii + 2 cd
n∑
k=1
dik ωik
}
which is variance of own shocks plus a weighted average of covariances that i
imports through trade (including from itself). If i and its trade partners tend
to be hit by similar shocks, i’s volatility will be higher compared with what
it would have been otherwise. This is the (first-order approximation of the)
diversification channel we study in Chapter 2. As said, correlation is covariance
between i and j over the product of i and j’s standard deviations. Notice
therefore that the product in the denominator will be high if both i and j are
trading with countries that tend to get similar shocks as i and j, respectively,
increasing thus their volatility.
Combining the results for covariance and variances (the numerator and de-
nominator of the expression below) gives the following formula for correlation
between i and j’s growth:
Cor(yˆi, yˆj) '(
1 + cd
(
dii + djj
) )
ωij + cd
(
dij ωjj + dji ωii
)
+ cd
∑
k 6=i,j
(
dik ωkj + djk ωik
)
(
ωii + 2 cd
∑n
k=1 dik ωik
)1/2(
ωjj + 2 cd
∑n
k=1 djk ωjk
)1/2
With this formula at hand, we can conjecture about the relative roles of the
direct- and indirect-trade channel on correlations. First, let us summarise the
results for bilateral trade intensities dij (direct trade between i and j). If i and j
trade only with each other, are symmetric in every respect, and Ωz is an identity
matrix, correlation between i and j simplifies to
2 cd d12
1 + 2 cd (1− d12)
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The derivative of this expression with respect to d12 = d21 is clearly positive.
Direct trade, in this stylized setting, increases bilateral correlation because it
makes countries exposed to each others’ shocks, while simultaneously decreasing
their volatility (trade with a country whose shocks are uncorrelated with the
domestic ones works as a hedge against own shocks).
Secondly, consider the case with no direct trade between i and j but
non-zero trade with a third country. Assuming the same kind of symmetry as
above, correlation between i and j is
2 cd d13ω13
1 + 2 cd (1− d13) + 2 cd d13ω13
which shows that trade with the third country matters, to the first-order ap-
proximation, only if it has non-zero covariance with one country in the pair.
For ω13 > 0, there will be a positive effect on i and j’s covariances because the
country they trade with tends to get similar shocks as the two countries. Vari-
ance is affected as well; first because there is lower exposure to domestic shocks
and secondly, trade with the third country brings another opportunity for di-
versification of shocks. With equal variances of shocks, the former will always
dominate the latter and variance of GDP growth unambiguously decreases. We
have thus established that indirect trade with a country that tends to get similar
shocks as i or b gives rise to positive correlation between i and j even if there is
no trade between i and j directly. The size of the effect rises with the intensity
of trade with the third country and with the magnitude of cross-covariances ω13.
However, the relative force of the third-country channel will, other things
equal, be smaller than of the direct-trade channel above because the same factor
that drives positive covariances (correlated shocks between i/j and the third
country) will, at the same time, limit the possibility for diversification of shocks.
Figure 1.1 compares the impact on correlation between i and j when countries
move from autarky to a) direct trade (full line) and b) to trade with a third
country (dashed lines). As argued, the quantitative impact of direct trade on
correlation is larger than the effect of the indirect trade (in this stylised setting).
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Figure 1.1: Correlation between i and j’s GDP growth: Move from autarky to
trade
Note: The figure shows the change in Cor(yˆi, yˆj) as countries move from autarky to trade.
There are three countries i, j, and k of equal size, for different values of trade intensity. The
full line is a case with direct trade between i and j but no trade with k, symmetric trade
costs and Ωz = Cov(Z) an identity matrix. The two other lines show the same correlation
when there is no direct trade but both i and j trade (symmetrically again) with k. Ωz is a
diagonal matrix with nonzero ωi3 = ωj3, taking values as shown in the figure.
However, the latter is by no means insignificant and depends on the magnitude
of covariance between shocks.
1.3.2 Sensitivity analysis
We now return to the general formula for covariances (1.12) and present several
experiments that assess the robustness of the results we have presented so far
to other parameters in the model. In order to make the analysis tractable, we
need to make assumptions about the structure of the terms in expected values
in (1.12): covariances of trade shocks, covariances of country-specific shocks and
their cross covariances.11
11The matrix of cross-covariances of trade and country-specific shocks is the expression in
the second and third line in (1.12). The sum of the two lines is a symmetric square matrix.
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Regarding trade shocks, let us denote σκ the variance of trade shocks κˆij and
σκκ the covariance between trade shocks across pairs. Let these be the same for
all country pairs. The symmetry in κˆs and the fact that κiit = 1 (and therefore
κˆiit = 0) implies a particular form of the covariance matrix Ωκ. Appendix 1.A.2
gives an example of how this matrix looks like for three countries. As before,
we denote Ωz the covariance matrix of country specific shocks with elements
ωij. Cross-terms Ωκz capturing covariances between country-specific shocks and
trade shocks are assumed fixed at σκz, except for those with κˆiit = 0, where they
will be zero. With this notation, covariance of GDP growth rates is
Cov(y) =
1
(β + θ)2
M(D)−1
[
(2 + θ)2 DL Ωκ DL
T
+ θ (2 + θ) DL Ωκz
(
I + (1 + θ) DT
)
+ θ (2 + θ)
(
I + (1 + θ) D
)
ΩTκzDL
T
+ θ2
(
I + (1 + θ) D
)
Ωz
(
I + (1 + θ) DT
)] (
M(D)−1
)T
Within this framework, we carry out several simulations:
Volatile trade shocks: When trade shocks are allowed to vary, each coun-
try pair receives an additional source of perfectly correlated shocks (correlated
within the pair), where the latter follows from our assumption of symmetric
trade costs. Not surprisingly, this makes bilateral correlations increase for coun-
tries that directly trade with each other. Mathematically, the term DL Ωκ DL
T
within the covariance matrix adds the additional variance (weighted with di-
rect trade shares) and covariances that may affect each of the pair via its trade
partners:
ij element of DL Ωκ DL
T = dijdijσκ +
∑
k 6=j
∑
l 6=i
dikdjlσκκ
If the two countries trade with a third country but not with each other and if
covariance among trade shocks are zero across pairs, covariance of their growth
rates will not be affected because they do not benefit from the additional source
of perfectly correlated shocks, unlike in the case with direct trade. However,
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Figure 1.2: Correlation of GDP growth: Volatile trade costs
Note: The figure shows the change in Cor(yˆ1, yˆ2) compared with autarky. Dashed
line = Baseline: d12 = d21 (left panel) or d13 = d23 = d31 = d13 (right panel), no trade
otherwise, Ωz = I (left panel) or ω13 = ω23 = 1/2 (right panel), Ωk = 0, Ωzk = 0. Solid line:
Ωk with σκ = 1 and σκκ = 0.
since each of the countries will now become exposed to this new source of shocks
through its trade with the third country, their volatility will rise. Therefore,
correlation between their GDP growth rates offsets the indirect-trade channel
described above so that, as trade with the third country increases, correlations
start falling again. See Figure 1.2 for an illustration.
Volatile, correlated trade shocks: When trade shocks are correlated across
country pairs, then it increases comovement because trade partners in the pair
become subject to more similar shocks. Naturally, for a pair that trades solely
with each other, this makes no difference (the left panel of Figure 1.3 is indis-
tinguishable from the one in 1.2). In the opposite case, for countries that do
not trade with each other, the fact that they tend to get coincident trade shocks
makes them more correlated. In the formula above, this would be captured with
nonzero terms σκκ.
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Figure 1.3: Correlation of GDP growth: Volatile, correlated trade costs
Note: The figure shows the change in Cor(yˆ1, yˆ2) compared with autarky. Dashed
line: Baseline, see Figure 1.2 for details. Solid line: Ωk with σκ = 1 and σκκ = 1/2.
Volatile trade shocks correlated with country-specific shocks: If κs
tend to be high (a positive trade shock) when country-specific productivity
shocks are high, their joined effect is more pronounced and countries become
more correlated. The intuition is similar as for the previous case but the ef-
fect is stronger for both scenarios. In the one with direct trade, not only are
trade shocks perfectly correlated within the pair (by the symmetry) but they
now also tend to comove with both shocks. Because of the symmetry, they am-
plify bilaterally-good or bilaterally-bad shocks and moderate the opposite ones,
which strengthens the diversification nature of trade. In the scenario with in-
direct trade only, the additional comovement is generated through an identical
mechanism but this time with respect to the third country.
Greater θ: The final exercise we present is to verify that our main conclusions
presented so far are robust to different values on θ.12 This parameter determines
12We do not report a similar exercise with respect to parameter β because it has a clear
counterpart in data. Let us only note that changes of β of the same magnitude as we make
to θ produce similar changes to our figures – but of the opposite sign. Recall that β is the
1. TRADE AND COMOVEMENT 36
Figure 1.4: Correlation of GDP growth: Volatile trade shocks correlated with zˆ
Note: The figure shows the change in Cor(yˆ1, yˆ2) compared with autarky. Dashed
line: Baseline, see Figure 1.2 for details. Solid line: Ωk with σκ = 1 and σκz = 1/2.
the shape of the distribution from which productivity shocks are drawn. As said,
higher θ means that shocks are more volatile. Recall that when we described the
solution to our model in section 1.2.1, we argued that shocks affect the model
economy through several channels, with one of them operating through changes
in relative prices. This mechanism was shown to be positive related to θ in the
log-linear approximation of the model. Higher θ therefore makes prices, relative
demands for goods and hence also output more sensitive to shocks, increasing
thus the potential for exploiting the country’s comparative advantage. This is to
say that production processes become less similar across countries and therefore
their covariance decreases. Likewise, volatility should increase, which leads to an
overall fall in correlations and smaller power of trade to generate comovement.
Figure 1.5 quantifies this mechanism for the two special cases of openness and
for θ = 0.5 versus θ = 0.7. The effect, while significant, is quantitatively smaller
than the effects of the above reported exercises and importantly, it does not
share of the unproduced input in our model (equipped labour); higher β therefore decreases
the share of traded intermediates, which mutes the response of output to shocks, both foreign
and domestic (see (1.11)) and makes countries more correlated.
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Figure 1.5: Correlation of GDP growth: Role of θ
Note: The figure shows the change in Cor(yˆ1, yˆ2) compared with autarky. Dashed
line: Baseline with θ = 0.5, see Figure 1.2 for details. Solid line: θ = 0.7.
change the conclusions qualitatively.
1.4 Quantitative exercises with data
In this section we look at the relationship between trade and GDP correlations,
as observed in data, through the lens of the model we studied in the preceding
sections. To accommodate the range of parameters we obtain from data, we work
with the fully-fledged (not linearised) version of the model and use numerical
techniques to compute its solution. The model allows us to investigate various
aspects of data to judge the quantitative significance of the competing theoretical
factors. Our strategy therefore is to experiment with the pattern of empirical
trade linkages, compute alternative GDP growth rates for all countries and years,
obtain bilateral correlations Corexij and compare them with those in the baseline.
The baseline scenario is based on country-specific shocks zˆit and trade shocks
κˆijt exactly as found in data. Shocks zˆit are taken as exogenous and do not vary
across simulations. Trade imbalances are used in the mapping of observables to
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parameters used in the model but are ignored in the quantitative simulations
(they are not explained by the model).
The road map for our work is as follows:
1. We start with a description of our sample and of the data we use in the
model. We also provide a check that the baseline, to which we compare
all subsequent simulations, matches the correlations found in data.
2. The first question we investigate is the quantitative power of trade to
generate comovement. We do so by comparing the results of the model
with baseline trade costs and to the volatility that would prevail in autarky.
3. We further examine the properties of trade costs and test whether it is the
average level of trade costs, their trend changes over time or their volatility
(trade shocks) that drive the results.
4. We then move to study several candidate mechanisms through which trade
could play a role as a channel for transmission of country-specific shocks.
Namely, we ask:
• What part of bilateral correlations can be accounted for by direct
trade within each pair of countries and what is due to the indirect
trade with all other countries?
• If the indirect-trade channel turns out important, then which coun-
tries matter? Big common trade partners? Big global players overall?
Can theory guide us in identifying countries that account for most of
the effect of the indirect trade?
1.4.1 Parametrisation of the model
Our sample consists of n = 69 countries and an additional aggregate for the rest
of the world (ROW). Out of the biggest 30 countries in the world only Russia
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(together with other post-Soviet republics) is merged in the ROW.13 The 69
sample countries accounted jointly for 95% world nominal GDP in 2005. Our
focus is on annual data from the period 1989-2011; with this choice we mean
to take into account the changes in trade linkages brought about by the overall
expansion in trade that started to gather pace from 1980s and also take into
account the fall of the iron curtain. The length of the sample period is also
dictated by sufficient availability of trade data for the large number of country
pairs we work with.
There are n2 parameters in the model we need to identify for every year of
data: n−1 trade shares dij for every country i and n productivities Zi. Starting
with trade shares, dij is the share of goods produced in country j in total demand
for goods in country i. Its definition in the model14 is
dij =
Iij
Lipiqi
=
Iij
GNOi − Si
with dii implied from the restriction
∑
j dij = 1. We take imports Iij and trade
imbalances Si from IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (see Appendix 1.A.3 for a
more detailed description of all variables). Variable GNOi ≡
∫
pi(x)qi(x)dΦ (x)
is the value of total production, or gross output.
Collecting reliable data for gross output is a challenging task because ade-
quately long time series are available only for a handful of countries (more or less
those covered in EU KLEMS). We take this route in Chapter 2, where we study
volatility of a smaller sample of relatively large countries. However, the study
of comovement requires a large sample of countries otherwise the residual ROW
13Other important countries (ordered here according to their 2005 nominal GDP in US$)
treated as the ROW include Iran, Hong-Kong (China), the Czech Republic, Singapore, Slo-
vakia, Vietnam, Croatia and Libya. See Appendix 1.A.5 for a list of countries and country
codes.
14Notice that the identification strategy we follow here to back out the parameters of the
model is identical to that presented in Chapter 2. However, the choice of variables to which
we map our observables, is different.
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aggregate quickly starts dominating the comovement patterns for the majority
of countries.15
We therefore by-pass the need to use (or even estimate) gross output data for
a large selection of countries and make a pragmatic assumption that output is a
fixed multiple of GDP: GNOi = GDPi/β, where β = 1/2.
16 This assumption is
consistent with our model because gross output data (even if statisticians were
able to estimate it with a high degree of reliability) are affected by processes
that are not captured in the model. Namely, gross output crucially depends
on the degree of integration of production processes, which may differ across
countries and, more fundamentally for our needs, within a country over time.
This is largely relevant for the transition economies included in our sample
(most notably China) but it is of some importance also for developed countries,
where the organisation of production processes may for instance respond to
changes in tax or accounting laws. However, whether a company produces a
part of a machine in-house or sublets the task to another domestic company
may be irrelevant for the amount of goods the economy trades externally. Yet,
it would affect the gross output series and therefore our measures of openness
and trade costs. Added to this, the effort statisticians put to constructing a
consistent series of gross output is also typically lower than is the case of other
key aggregates. Based on this, our trade shares are identified as
dij =
Iij
GDPi/β − Si
With a measure of dij and assuming symmetric trade costs κij = κji, as we
do consistently throughout this chapter, equation (1.6) implies
κij =
(
dij
djj
dji
dii
)θ/2
which means that trade costs are completely determined by the trade shares
defined above. This procedure gives a point estimate of trade costs for each of
15Even with 69 largest countries in our sample, the ROW still accounts for 5% of world
GDP and is the 5th largest economy in the model.
16β = 1/2 corresponds to the average GDP-to-output ratio found in data used in Chapter
2.
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Figure 1.6: Average trade costs and distribution of κijt in 1989-2011
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the more than 2000 country pairs every year. Annual averages of trade costs
are shown on the left panel of Figure 1.6. Notice that they are enormous: the
average value of κij overall is 0.03 (median 0.02), where κij = 0 ensures zero trade
between i and j and κ = 1 is a situation where across-the-border trade is equally
costly as domestic trade. Highest values of κ are recorded between Belgium and
the Netherlands (0.23), the U.S. and Canada (0.18), and further among Germany
and the Netherlands/Belgium/Austria, Belgium and France, and the U.S. and
Mexico. A longer list of country pairs with lowest bilateral trade costs is reported
in Figure 1.14. Also note that κs grow over time: average κ increase from 0.019
to 0.027 in our sample period, where the trend is much more pronounced for
some countries. For instance, average trade costs of all countries with China rise
from 0.02 to 0.06 over the same period. The distribution of average trade costs
(per country pair over time) is shown on the right panel of Figure 1.6.
Turning to the productivity measure Zi, equation (1.6) again can be used to
express real aggregate GDP as:
Lwi
pi
= (AB)−
1
β
(
Zi
dii
)θ/β
from which we can obtain a measure of shocks Zi. In 2.A.3 we show that a
natural counterpart of the Liwi/pi series in our model is the Penn World Table’s
series of constant-price GDP in international dollars; we use the data in Chapter
2. This approach, again, is less appropriate when the sample consists of a
wider selection of countries because, as mentioned in Deaton and Heston (2010),
of the inferior properties of the international-dollar series for some countries;
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the problem becomes acute when less-developed economies are included in the
sample. As the focus of our work is at the comovement of GDP fluctuations,
we base our results on constant-price GDP growth rates computed with local-
currency GDP data and anchor the series to the 2005 levels of GDP expressed
in USD. For the base year, we favour using GDP levels converted by actual
exchange rates rather than PPPs because PPPs reflect domestic purchasing
power (in comparable terms) rather than actual purchasing power abroad that
is key for the transmission of demand shocks. Shocks Zit for 10 biggest countries
in the model are shown in Figure 1.7.
Consistently with Chapter 2, where we discuss the choice of θ in bigger detail,
we choose θ = 1/2. Simulations reported in the previous section confirmed that
both our qualitative conclusions and broadly also the quantitative estimates we
make are robust to different values of this parameter.
How good is the fit of our model? We would expect the fit be quite good
overall because the same variables that we use to identify the model parameters
are those that we expect to get from the model. However, we do not aspire to
match individual bilateral correlations because there are two sources of discrep-
ancy that are going to worsen the pair-by-pair fit of the model: the model (1)
imposes symmetry on trade costs, and (2) ignores trade imbalances. A compari-
son of correlation matrices is not straightforward because it involves checking of
n(n−1)
2
entries; with 70 countries this is 2415 bilateral correlations of GDP growth
rates. The first check we do is plotting all bilateral correlations in a scatter plot
that shows, pair-by-pair, how successful the model is in matching correlations
found in the data, i.e. in generating the same type of comovement. This is the
left panel of Figure 1.8. We interpret the figure as giving quite strong support
to the model. Obviously, there is a significant amount of mismatch but only
few correlations that were significantly positive or negative in the data take the
opposite sign in the model. Correlation between the data and model series is
positive and high (0.86) and the slope of the trend line we fit through the data
is lower but close to the 45◦ line.
The right panel of the figure report histograms of the bilateral correlations
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Figure 1.7: Shocks Z for 10 biggest countries
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Figure 1.8: Model v Data
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Note: The scatter plot shows correlations of GDP growth rates in data (horizontal axis) and
as computed by our model and the histogram plots their respective distributions.
from the model (bars) and from the data (line). The point of plotting distri-
butions is to contrast the level of dispersion and other characteristics of both
series. In this particular case, the mean of correlations computed from the
model is lower than found in the data (0.13 v 0.18) and the difference is more
pronounced for the median of the distribution (0.11 v 0.18). To put it differently,
the model-generated distribution is more skewed to the right (skewness of 0.27
v 0.09). This is not surprising; the symmetry imposed by the model makes it
generate correlations centred closer to zero because trade costs within the pair,
averaged by the symmetry, will be generally closer to zero except for the cases
when the underlying trade intensities we use to compute κs were high for both
countries in the pair. Finally, let us note that there is about the same level of
variance in both distributions (0.27 v 0.28). Overall, both the scatter plot and
the distributions buttress our confidence that the model is capable to replicate
the data we put in in both the qualitative and quantitative sense.
1.4.2 Autarky versus baseline
Having discussed the choice of parameters and the fit of the model, the first ques-
tion we investigate is the quantitative power of trade to generate comovement.
We do so by comparing the baseline results from the model with correlations
that we obtain by assuming complete autarky. In this case, κijt = 0 for all i 6= j
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and κijt = 1 for i = j. We have shown above that since the only source of
volatility in autarky are the country-specific shocks Zit, comovement in GDP
growth rates is bound to mimic the correlations in productivity shocks. Should
trade have only a marginal effect on correlations, we would expect that baseline
correlations be close to those in autarky, i.e. close to the 45◦ line in the scatter
plot Figure 1.9. However, we observe a lot of variation around the diagonal
line. Since these two scenarios differ only with κs, we conclude that trade does
significantly affect bilateral correlations.
What can we say about the direction of the effect? Observations below the
45◦ line in the figure are the bilateral correlations that have increased with trade
compared with their values in autarky; the strength of the effect rises with the
distance to the 45◦ line. This is the case for 71% pair-wise correlations while for
the remaining 29% pairs, trade makes bilateral correlations lower than would
be the case in autarky. The histogram of trade-induced changes in correlations
(absolute differences to autarky correlations) is depicted on the right panel of the
figure. The (unweighted) average of the distribution is 0.08 and median 0.06 but
there is a significant amount of variability in the effects on particular correlations
(standard deviation is 0.15) and the distribution is strongly skewed to the right.
The point we take from this exercise is that trade has a significant effect on
bilateral comovement, which is on average positive but the particular outcome
depends on how much and with whom a country trades (this is consistent with
the theoretical formulas derived in Section 1.3.1).
1.4.3 Role of trade costs
The question is then whether the change in comovement due to trade is driven
primarily by the level of trade costs or rather by the additional volatility brought
about by changes in κijt. According to the simulations presented in this section,
the answer is that the ‘level’ effect (of average trade costs) has a relatively small
impact on correlations in our sample. The fact that trade costs change over time
but also that they are inherently volatile, account for a larger part of the overall
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Figure 1.9: Trade v Autarky
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Note: The scatter plot shows bilateral correlations with trade costs as in the data (horizontal
axis) against correlations in autarky. The histogram plots the distribution of the absolute
change in bilateral correlations induced by trade.
effect.
First, we test the ‘level’ effect by asking what would the change in bilateral
correlations (compared with autarky) be had trade costs been fixed over time
at the bilateral averages: κijt = κijt ≥ 0. Figure 1.10 shows the scatter plot
and histogram analogous to the case with actual κijt presented above (notice
the difference in scale in the histogram here relative to Figure 1.9). Clearly,
correlations differ only marginally from those experienced in autarky; the mean
and median change in correlations is 0.01 with standard deviation less than 0.01.
Why is it the case?
Part of the explanation for the small effect of the level of openness is that
moves in κ from zero (autarky) to κijt generally do not map one-to-one to
changes in correlations; the correlation coefficient between average trade costs,
i.e. κijt − 0, and the changes in correlations generated by them is only 0.5.
However, the small average size of κ also plays a role. The right panel of Figure
1.11 presents the histograms of changes in bilateral correlations (compared with
autarky) computed with κ∗ijt = 2 ·κijt and κ∗∗ijt = 3 ·κijt, i.e. with still zero trade
shocks but twice and three-times higher levels of κs (smaller trade costs). For
the sake of comparison, also shown are the previously discussed distributions
obtained with κijt (full line) and the baseline distribution with trade shocks κijt
(with markers), and a scatter plot of correlations with κ∗∗ijt = 3 · κijt against
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Figure 1.10: Correlations with trade and in autarky – with constant trade costs
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Note: The scatter plot shows bilateral correlations without trade shocks (horizontal axis)
against correlations in autarky. The histogram plots the distribution of the absolute change
in bilateral correlations induced by the level -change in trade costs.
Figure 1.11: Histogram of correlations with constant trade costs – larger κ
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Note: The scatter plot shows bilateral correlations with constant κ∗∗ijt = 3 · κijt (horizontal
axis) against correlations in autarky. The histogram plots the corresponding distributions of
changes in bilateral correlations (compared with autarky).
autarky. Both figures suggest that the level of trade costs has, in principle, the
power to generate a quantitatively significant change in correlations. However,
the average level of trade costs in our sample is too small to do so. On a 0-
1 scale, with 0 being autarky and 1 costless trade, the average value of κij is
only 0.03 (median 0.02) with maximum of 0.23 recorded between Belgium and
the Netherlands (see Figure 1.6 for the distribution of κs). When κijt doubles
and triples, the mean change in correlations (v autarky) rises from 0.01 to 0.02
(median 0.02) and to 0.04 (median 0.03), respectively.
Having discussed why the ‘level’ effect of lowering trade costs is quantitatively
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small in our sample, the next question is what other factors are behind the large
effects of trade overall, as shown in Figure 1.9. They could be due to strong
trends in κijt, the volatility around the trends (pure trade shocks), or both. We
have illustrated in Figure 1.6 that κs do grow over time and for some countries,
especially those that experienced a rapid integration into world trade channels
in the sample period, the trend in κs is enormous. Cheaper and faster means
of transport make the case of a synchronous downward trend in trade costs
intuitively appealing. We therefore ask whether synchronised trends in κ could
explain the observed change in bilateral correlations.
We examine this question by using, first, trends extracted from κijt with an
HP filter17, and secondly, relative trade shocks applied to the sample and cross-
country average κ = 0.03. Results are presented in Figure 1.12. What we learn
from this figure is that both trend changes in κijt and shocks to trade costs
matter more for comovement than the average level of κijt. The distributions
of changes in correlations computed in these scenarios are closer to the baseline
than those computed with constant κs. Means and medians of both distributions
are still small 0.02 (compared with 0.08 in the baseline) but standard deviations
rise to 0.06 and 0.07, respective (compared to 0.15 in the baseline).
To summarise the findings of the exercises presented so far, we have shown
that trade matters for cross-country correlations. Opening to trade makes corre-
lations between GDP growth rates increase 0.08 points on average and generates
a significant level of dispersion (for half of the country pairs the changes in cor-
relations are either negative and lower than -0.01 or more positive and larger
than 0.15 – these are the lower and upper quartiles of the distribution). We have
further shown that the main driving force behind the effects of trade on correla-
tions seems to be the movements in trade costs over time; both their (possibly
synchronised) trends and fluctuations around trends are important factors in
accounting for the dispersion and, to a lesser extent, for the magnitude of the
effects of trade on comovement. The average level of trade costs has, on the
17We use smoothing parameter 6.25, in line with Ravn (2001).
1. TRADE AND COMOVEMENT 49
Figure 1.12: Histogram of correlations with smoothed and detrended trade costs
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Note: The scatter plots shows bilateral correlations with smoothed κijt (top left panel) and
detrended κijt (top right panel) against correlations in autarky (vertical axis). The histogram
plots the corresponding distributions of changes in bilateral correlations (compared with
autarky).
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other hand, had only a little impact so far but could become more significant in
the future, if trade costs continue falling.
1.4.4 Direct versus indirect trade
In the exercises that follow, we concentrate on the role of trade in transmitting
country-specific shocks. Our aim is to assess the quantitative importance of the
two competing channels we have identified in the theoretical section: the role
of direct trade linkages between i and j, and the role of indirect trade between
i or j with third countries. We have seen above that in a stylised setting with
three countries, identical volatilities and full symmetry in trade relationship,
the effect of direct trade on bilateral correlations between i and j is relatively
larger that that of trade with third countries, in particular if the shocks affecting
the third country are not strongly correlated with those hitting i or j. In this
section we therefore test to what extent is this stylised setting representative of
the patterns in actual data. In order to isolate the transmission role of trade
from the effects of falling trade cost or their volatility, we freeze κijs at their
average pair-specific values.
We proceed as follows: for a country pair a, b, we keep the pair-specific average
κab as found in data
18 while cancelling all other trade linkages between countries
a and b and the rest of the world, as well as among all other countries.19 In
other words, except for trade between a and b there is no other trade taking place
globally. With this pattern of trade costs, the model generates a new solution for
GDP with a new correlation matrix of growth among all countries. We record the
impact on the coefficient of correlation between the concerned country pair and
repeat the exercise for another pair. In total, we carry out n(n−1)/2 simulations
and obtain a matrix of corDij with each element representing correlation between
i and j when the only trade these country engage in is trade between them.
18For ease of notation, we now ignore bars that in the previous section denoted averages.
19To compute corDab, we set κ
D
ijt = κijt for i = a, j = b and i = b, j = a (trade costs are
symmetric in our model), κDiit = 1 as always for all i, and κ
D
ijt = 0 otherwise.
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Figure 1.13: Effects of direct and indirect trade on comovement
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Note: The variables shown in these scatter plots measure changes correlations induced by
certain type of trade relative to autarky. In the left panel, we compare the scenario with
direct (and no other) trade between two countries to the baseline with all trade, while the
right panel compares the scenario with no direct trade. Always with no volatility in trade
costs.
An alternative way of testing the importance of direct trade linkages is to start
from the baseline (when all trade costs are at their averages as measured in data)
and cancel only the direct pair-specific links between a and b. Recording the
bilateral terms computed in this manner in cornoDij and repeating the simulations
for all country pairs, we obtain bilateral correlations that would prevail without
any ‘direct’ trade between a given pair of countries. Figure 1.13 reports how
the scenarios with and without direct trade perform in terms of replicating the
changes in correlations obtained with both types of trade (compared always with
autarky).
We contrast the changes in correlations obtained in both exercises (corDij −
corAij and cor
noD
ij − corAij) with those with both types of trade allowed (baseline
with fixed trade costs). Visual inspection of scatter plots presented in Figure
1.13 suggests that the direct-trade channel performs relatively poorly compared
with the indirect one. With only the direct trade, all changes in correlations
are positive, which is in line with the conclusions of our theoretical analysis.
However, only in few cases is the direct channel able to move correlations sub-
stantially towards those computed with both channels ‘on’. Viewed from another
perspective, closing the direct channel while keeping all the indirect trade is very
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close to the solution with both channels ‘on’.
To quantify the relative role of the two channels, let us decompose the vari-
ance of the contribution of trade to correlations (always with fixed κs) to parts
accounted for by direct trade, indirect trade and a residual term, respectively.
To be precise, we use the following identity:
(
corij − corAutij
)
=
(
corDij − corAutij
)
+
(
cornoDij − corAutij
)
+ (residualij)
or with short-hand notation:
cAllij = c
D
ij + c
noD
ij + rij
As in Fujita and Ramey (2008), we then compute the contributions of the terms
on the right-hand side to the variance of the dependent variable as follows:
V ar
(
cAllij
)
= Cov
(
cAllij , c
All
ij
)
= Cov
(
cAllij , c
D
ij
)
+ Cov
(
cAllij , c
noD
ij
)
+ Cov
(
cAllij , rij
)
where each of the covariance terms gives the amount of variation in the total
contribution of trade to comovement that is generated by the variation in the
given variable. Dividing by V ar
(
cAllij
)
and multiplying by 100, we obtain the
% share of variance explained by each variable. The results are the following:
variability in correlations due to direct trade accounts for 9.8% of total variance,
variability in correlations due to indirect trade for 90.8% and the residual term
for the remaining -0.7%. We therefore conclude that the direct-trade channel
tends to explain less than 10% of the ‘level’ effect of trade on bilateral comove-
ment (keeping in mind that we abstract from any volatility in trade costs).
Not surprisingly, the magnitude of the average trade costs is the key deter-
minant of the strength of the direct-trade channel. See Figure 1.14 for a plot of
the relationship and a table of changes in correlations due to the direct channels
for countries that encounter large changes in trade costs.
Why is the indirect channel so powerful in data, compared with the analy-
sis in a stylised setting? There are two reasons. First, with many countries,
the exposure to the other country in the pair will typically be (much) smaller
than the exposure to all the other countries in the world. Also, the underlying
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Figure 1.14: Trade costs and the direct-trade channel
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BEL/LUX NLD 0.033 0.24
CAN USA 0.022 0.18
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AUT GER 0.021 0.15
MEX USA 0.014 0.15
IRL GBR 0.009 0.15
MALAYS. THA 0.011 0.15
CHE GER 0.022 0.13
FRA GER 0.013 0.13
Note: The figure plots bilateral correlations when the only trade any two countries engage
in is trade directly between them (horizontal axis) against the level of trade costs κ for the
given country-pair (vertical axis). Cases with greatest impact are listed.
shocks are, on average, weakly but positively correlated. We have shown in the
theoretical part that the strength of the indirect channel rises with openness to
third countries and with the correlation of their shocks with the other country
in the pair. Therefore, both these factors work jointly to increase the role of the
indirect channel compared with the direct one.
1.4.5 Further thoughts about the indirect-trade channel
Given the significance of the indirect trade, a logical question that arises is what
are the important ‘third countries’ that are responsible for driving the overall
effect of the indirect-trade channel. We try to answer this question in three
ways. The first and second one are groups of countries that almost automatically
suggest them selves given their relative importance in trade of most countries:
first, we test the importance for correlations of big common trade partners
for each pair by pair (keeping all else unchanged); secondly, we test whether the
openness or closure of big global players matters. To preview the answers,
we do not find unambiguous support that one of these groups of countries is the
dominant factor behind the ‘indirect-trade’ channel. Finally, we therefore turn
to the theory presented in the previous section to guide us in the identification
of the relevant countries.
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We do the first two exercises as follows. First, for the n big common trade
partners, we start with the baseline with all trade linkages (but average trade
costs) and for each pair find the n largest common trade partners based on the
geometric average of trade intensities in the baseline and impose prohibitive
trade costs between these and i and j. Trade costs for all other countries are as
in the baseline. Averaging the dijs geometrically gives importance to similarity,
hence when we then take the first n largest dikdjk, we pick those partners k that
are important for both i and j. We do this for all the pairs in the model and
record every time the ij element of the correlation matrix. Secondly, for the
scenario without the big players, we impose that all countries jointly face pro-
hibitive trade costs against (one country each time): (1) the U.S., then against
(2) China, (3) Japan, (4) Germany and (5) the rest of the world aggregate ROW.
Finally, we impose prohibitive trade costs against (1-5) jointly. Scatter plots are
presented in Appendix 1.A.4.
What do we find? Regarding the role of common trade partners, their pres-
ence could, in principle, matter for i and j’s comovement given that typically
they jointly account for a significant share of the pair’s trade. Therefore, one
could argue, they represent a potentially important channel for the pass-through
of shocks from one country in the pair to the other. The more common partners
are dropped, each of the pair could start trading with the remaining countries,
potentially each with different ones, which could disrupt the overall pattern of
correlations. However, Figures 1.16 – 1.20 do not provide convincing answers.
The overall effect of dropping common trade partners does not seem to change
correlations in a systematic manner. Those that became high (low) with all
trade linkages ‘on’ compared with autarky typically remain high (low) when
common trade partners drop. The majority of observations is still reasonably
close to the diagonal line (which plots the baseline changes in correlations). The
outliers, for which dropping of common trade partners matters significantly, are
relatively scarce, although their number rises as the number of dropped common
partners goes up.
Regarding the role of big global players, we do this exercise for the U.S.,
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China, Japan, Germany and the rest-of-the-world aggregate (see Figures 1.21 –
1.25). Again, the systematic pattern that was there with all trade seems not
to be dramatically affected. We observe the largest effects here in the cases
when there is no trade with Germany and the ROW. One could argue that
this is because these two countries are strongly integrated (artificially so in the
case of the ROW) with a large number of still relatively big countries, playing
so the role of a global trade hub. Their collapse (or, better to say, closure)
might substantially distort other big countries they trade with, and consequently
also the trade patterns of the remaining countries. For Japan and China, the
effects are smaller and one could conjecture that this follows from their relatively
lower integration with other (larger) countries around the world, so the fact that
they disappear from the map of world-wide trade may still disrupt a number of
countries (the effect is particularly visible for China), however, the second-order
effects are not so damaging as in the case of Germany and the ROW. We would
liken them to regional hubs. The U.S. seem to be an intermediate case.
To summarise, the impacts both these groups of countries have on correlations
are not as large as one could have expected based on their relative importance (in
terms of trade). It seems that the remaining countries, which each pair remains
open to, seem powerful enough to deliver a substantial part of correlations be-
tween i and j that would be there in the baseline. However, this is not surprising
in view of the results we obtained in the theoretical section. We have concluded
there that two countries’ growth rates will be correlated, among others, if one
of the pair trades with another country that tend to be hit by similar shocks
as the other country in the pair. To relate this result to the exercises presented
here, it suggests that the countries we have dropped (common trade partners or
globally big countries) have not fundamentally narrowed the exposure to shocks
that also affect one of the countries in the pair.
We test whether this conjecture is empirically relevant in the following way.
We close all trade (including the direct one between i and j) except five particular
trade partners of i and five trade partners of j. We illustrate the principle
through which we choose them on one of the pair, say country i. First, we
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Figure 1.15: Direct v indirect trade with a small group of countries
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Note: The left scatter plot compares changes in correlations induced by indirect trade with
5 selected countries compared to the baseline with all trade. See main text on how the 5
countries are chosen. The right panel plot similar variable for the case of direct trade only.
require that the chosen trade partners of i get hit by shocks that are positively
correlated with j. This ensures that a pass-through of shocks to i that affect
also j. Secondly, we require that these countries are negatively correlated with
i. We do so in order to provide opportunity for the stabilising effect trade has
on volatility. If i trades with someone who tends to get good shocks when i
receives bad shocks, both countries become less volatile. Because variance is
negatively related to correlations, this factor may also relevant for choosing the
‘right’ countries. Out of the countries, whose shocks are most correlated with
j and least correlated with i, we take five biggest ones. We repeat the same
procedure for j. For thus the selected countries k we set κik and κjk equal to
their respective averages in data and keep all other (off-diagonal) κs zero.
To see how these 5 countries for i and 5 countries for j matter for i and j’s
comovement, let us compare changes in correlations we obtain in this exercise
(for a lack of a better name, we will refer to it as a model-based exercise in
what follows) with those for the direct- and indirect-trade channel reported in
Figure 1.13. For greater clarity, we replicate the left panel (direct trade) of the
figure together with results of the model-based case in Figure 1.15, where we
change the axis to focus only on cases where trade increases comovement.20
20Note that by the setup of the exercise, all correlations will be positive, therefore we do
have much to say about the cases where direct or indirect trade leads to negative correlations.
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Based on the results presented in Figure 1.15, we conclude that the model-
based exercise is substantially more successful in matching the baseline corre-
lations than the bilateral channel. The descriptive statistics for the subsample
(65% observations) shown in the figure are as follows: the mean change in cor-
relations (trade v autarky) in the baseline is 0.009; direct trade delivers average
change only of 0.001 while the indirect-trade case takes us to 0.008; the model-
based case gives 0.005. In terms of volatility, the model-based one generates
standard deviations of around two-thirds of the those obtained in the baseline
and with indirect trade (0.008 and 0.007 respectively, compared with 0.005 in
the theory-guided case), while volatility with direct trade is only 0.002. Overall,
the figure suggests that a simple model-based selection of countries is capable
to generate the same type of a systematic relationship that we observe in the
baseline. For the country pairs where trade with all countries results in positive
and high comovement, trade with the few countries selected according to our
model gives also systematically higher comovement. The slope of a line fitted
through the model exercise is 0.52, compared with 0.87 with all indirect trade
and 0.13 with direct trade only. This is in a stark contrast to the cases with-
out several common trade partners and big countries, which were not able to
generate systematic departures from the baseline.
1.5 Conclusions
This chapter investigates the relationship between across-the-border trade in
goods and comovement in real GDP growth. We use data for a large sample of
countries that jointly account for 95% of world GDP. The particular questions
we ask are: Does openness to trade affect cross-country correlations? If so, what
determines whether two countries’ growth rates will be positively correlated?
We look at the relationship through the lens of a standard general equilibrium
framework that conceptualises the demand and supply linkages among countries,
which then work as a network for transmission of shocks. The model gives an
affirmative answer to the first question above. Comparing our baseline scenario
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(parameterised with trade and real GDP data) to autarky, we find that bilateral
correlations in the baseline are, on average, 0.08 higher than what they would
have been in autarky. However, there is a large amount of dispersion in the
effect going in both directions. We therefore conclude that trade matters for
comovement but the magnitude and sign of a particular realisation of the effect
depends on with whom and how much countries trade.
To answer the question on how trade affects comovement, we show that
the main driving force seems to have been the movements in trade costs over
time; both their (possibly synchronised) trends and fluctuations around trends
are important factors in accounting for the effects trade has had comovement.
Openness itself, i.e. the average level of trade costs, has had only a limited im-
pact so far but we show that if trade costs continue falling, the level of openness
gains on importance in the future.
Finally, we investigate the transmission of country-specific shocks through
trade. Deriving a closed-form formula for bilateral correlations, we confirm that
trade generates comovement as it exposes countries to shocks that affect their
direct trade partners. The role of this ‘direct’ channel has been a topic of many
studies estimating the links between comovement and bilateral trade between
i and j. However, we also point to another, less well studied channel that
generates comovement among countries irrespectively whether they trade with
each other or not. The presence of this ‘indirect’ (or third-country) channel, if
not controlled for, could introduce a systematic bias in the relationship between
direct trade and comovement.
The condition for the latter to generate comovement between any two coun-
tries is not, how one could think, that both of them would have to trade with the
same third country, which would than act as an intermediary for transmitting
their mutual shocks – while this channel may play a role, it is of second-order
importance. Our formulas point to a more straightforward way in which the
indirect channel matters: it suffices that countries, one of the pair trades with,
tend to receive similar shocks as the other in the pair. In other words, trade be-
tween i and k, which exposes i to k’s shocks, generates comovement also between
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i and j if k and j tend to be hit by similar shocks.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, we show that trade intensity between
any two countries bilaterally matters little for their comovement. In fact, 90%
of comovement (with trade costs fixed over time) is accounted for by trade with
third countries, i.e. by the indirect channel. Our findings could help shape the
identification strategies used in empirical studies because the formulas we have
derived suggest what factors need to be controlled for if one wishes to isolate
the influence third countries have on bilateral comovement.
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1.A Appendix
1.A.1 Proof that trade identities (1.3) are not linearly
independent
Summing first (n-1) equations in the system defined by equation (1.3)
n−1∑
i=1
Lipmiqi +
n−1∑
i=1
Si =
n−1∑
i=1
(
n∑
j=1
Ljpmjqjdji
)
Using
∑n
j=1 Si = 0 and rearranging the right-hand side
n−1∑
i=1
Lipmiqi − Sn =
n∑
j=1
Ljpmjqj
(
n−1∑
i=1
dji
)
Applying
∑n
j=1 dij = 1
n−1∑
i=1
Lipmiqi − Sn =
n∑
j=1
Ljpmjqj (1− djn)
Cancelling terms
−Sn = Lnpmnqn −
n∑
j=1
Ljpmjqjdjn
Rearranging to get the n-th equation in (1.3)
Lnpmnqn + Sn =
n∑
j=1
Ljpmjqjdjn
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1.A.2 Covariance matrix of κˆ
The matrix below illustrates the covariance matrix Ωκ = E
(
vec(K) vec(K)T
)
of vectorised trade shocks κˆs. We assume constant variances σκ and covariances
σκκ across pairs of countries ij − kl. Notice that because κiit = 1 and therefore
κˆiit = 0, the (ii− ii)th, some of the elements in the covariance matrix are zero.
Ωκ =
κˆ11 κˆ21 κˆ31 κˆ12 κˆ22 κˆ32 κˆ13 κˆ23 κˆ33
κˆ11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 σκ σκκ σκ 0 σκκ σκκ σκκ 0
0 σκκ σκ σκκ 0 σκκ 1 σκκ 0
0 σκ σκκ σκ 0 σκκ σκκ σκκ 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 σκκ σκκ σκκ 0 σκ σκκ σκ 0
0 σκκ σκ σκκ 0 σκκ σκ σκκ 0
0 σκκ σκκ σκκ 0 σκ σκκ σκ 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
κˆ21
κˆ31
κˆ12
κˆ22
κˆ32
κˆ13
κˆ23
κˆ33
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1.A.3 Data sources
The purpose of this section is to document our data sources and transformations
we carry out on the data.
Trade Data: We use US$ bilateral imports data, Iij, from 1989 to 2011 from
the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS). Based on the treatment of
certain trade unions in DOTS, we merge all data for Belgium and Luxembourg,
and South Africa and Botswana into their respective aggregates.
GDP in current prices: We take current-price GDP (valued in US$) for
1989-2010 from World Bank, World Development Indicators, variable NY GDP
MKTP CD. Supplementary sources for missing observations are UN Data and
New Zealand Statistical Office, growth rates for 2011 (and when missing for
2010) are taken from IMF World Economic Outlook (these may be semi-final
estimates or IMF’s forecasts).
GDP in constant prices: Constant-price GDP is constructed as follows.
First we fix the base year using GDP in 2005 denominated in USD (IMF’s
World Economic Outlook). Other years are linked to the base year by means
of growth rates computed on local-currency constant-price data (the source is
IMF World Economic Outlook again).
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1.A.4 Figures - scenarios without common / big trade
partners
The scatter plots below show changes in correlations induced by certain type
of trade relative to autarky. On the horizontal axis (common to all figures) is
change in correlations in GDP growth between i and j with all trade costs as in
data (average values of trade costs) relative to autarky. Variables shown on the
vertical axis differ across figures but always refer to the exercise when i and j
stops trading with one or more common trade partners or alternatively, when all
countries stop trading with one or more globally big countries, again relative to
autarky. Should the dropping of the respective country matter, observations will
be further apart from the 45◦ line. If observations remain close to the diagonal
line, trade with the dropped countries is not the key determinant of i and j’s
mutual correlations.
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Figure 1.16: Change in correlations: 1 largest common trade partner stops
trading with i and j
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Figure 1.17: Change in correlations: 2 largest common trade partners stop
trading with i and j
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Figure 1.18: Change in correlations: 3 largest common trade partners stop
trading with i and j
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Figure 1.19: Change in correlations: 4 largest common trade partners stop
trading with i and j
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Figure 1.20: Change in correlations: 5 largest common trade partners stop
trading with i and j
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Figure 1.21: Change in correlations: the U.S. stops trading with all
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Figure 1.22: Change in correlations: Japan stops trading with all
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Figure 1.23: Change in correlations: China stops trading with all
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Figure 1.24: Change in correlations: Germany stops trading with all
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Figure 1.25: Change in correlations: Rest-of-the-world stops trading with all
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Figure 1.26: Change in correlations: All 5 biggest countries stop trading with
all
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1.A.5 List of countries
ALGERIA DZA KOREA KOR
ARGENTINA ARG KUWAIT KWT
AUSTRALIA AUS MADAGASCAR MDG
AUSTRIA AUT MALAYSIA MYS
BANGLADESH BGD MEXICO MEX
BELGIUM and LUXEMBOURG BEL MOROCCO MAR
BRAZIL BRA NETHERLANDS NLD
BULGARIA BGR NEW ZEALAND NZL
CANADA CAN NIGERIA NGA
COLOMBIA COL NORWAY NOR
COSTA RICA CRI OMAN OMN
COTE D IVOIRE CIV PAKISTAN PAK
CUBA CUB PERU PER
CYPRUS CYP PHILIPPINES PHL
DENMARK DNK POLAND POL
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DOM PORTUGAL PRT
ECUADOR ECU QATAR QAT
EGYPT EGY ROMANIA ROM
FINLAND FIN SOUTH AFRICA ZAF
FRANCE FRA SAUDI ARABIA SAU
GERMANY DEU SPAIN ESP
GHANA GHA SRI LANKA LKA
GREECE GRC SUDAN SDN
GUATEMALA GTM SWEDEN SWE
HUNGARY HUN SWITZERLAND CHE
CHILE CHL SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC SYR
CHINA (MAINLAND) CHN THAILAND THA
INDIA IND TUNISIA TUN
INDONESIA IDN TURKEY TUR
IRELAND IRL UNITED ARAB EMIRATES ARE
ISRAEL ISR UNITED KINGDOM GBR
ITALY ITA UNITED STATES USA
JAMAICA JAM URUGUAY URY
JAPAN JPN VENEZUELA VEN
KENYA KEN ROW ROW
2Diversification through Trade
Joint work with
Francesco Caselli, Miklos Koren and Silvana Tenreyro
2.1 Introduction
An important question at the crossroads of macro-development and interna-
tional economics is whether (and how) openness to trade affects macroeconomic
volatility. A widely held view in academic and policy discussions is that interna-
tional trade leads to higher GDP volatility. The origins of this view are rooted
in a large class of theories of international trade predicting that openness to
trade increases specialization. Because specialization (or lack of diversification)
in production tends to increase a country’s exposure to shocks specific to the
sectors (or range of products) in which the country specializes, it is generally
inferred that trade increases volatility.
This paper revisits the theoretical case for a positive effect of trade on volatil-
ity. In particular, it begins by pointing out that the existing wisdom is strongly
predicated on the assumption that sector-specific shocks are the dominant source
of GDP volatility. Koren and Tenreyro (2007), however, find that country-
specific shocks (common to all sectors within a country) are at least as impor-
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tant in shaping volatility patterns in developed countries, and more critically
so in developing countries. We argue in this paper that the impact of trade on
volatility can be remarkably different if imperfectly correlated country-specific
shocks are indeed the dominant source of volatility. Concretely, using one of
the canonical models of international trade, we show that openness to trade, by
reducing exposure to domestic shocks, can lead to lower GDP volatility; this
will be true as long as the volatility of trading partners and covariance of shocks
across countries are not too big; in other words, trade can act as a channel for
the diversification of country-specific shocks and in that way contribute to lower
volatility. More generally, the sign and size of the effect depends critically on
the variance-covariance of shocks across countries.
To make our point, we study a model of trade and GDP determination in
which shocks are country-specific, affecting all sectors in a country. The model
builds on a variation of the Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Alvarez and Lucas
(2007)’s model1, augmented to allow for aggregate shocks. Production combines
labour and a variety of tradable inputs that are subject to cost shocks. Some
of these shocks are idiosyncratic, as in the original EKAL model, and some are
aggregate, affecting all sectors in the country. The model delivers the following
predictions. If country-specific shocks are iid across countries, a multilateral
move from autarky to costless free trade unambiguously reduces volatility in all
countries. The reduction in volatility is stronger the smaller the country, ceteris
paribus. This is because a smaller country trades relatively more (relative to
its GDP) and hence can more easily diversify the exposure to its own-country
shocks, both on the demand and supply side. Results can be reversed, how-
ever, if the variances of and covariances with trading partners’ shocks are high
enough. The model also shows that a move from autarky to free trade causes
the covariance of growth rates across countries with the rest of the world to
increase; this increase is smaller for bigger countries, which, by their sheer size
will be relatively less affected by the increase in trade openness. (As is com-
mon in Ricardian models, the increase in trade due to lower transaction costs
1Henceafter referred to as the EKAL model or each paper separately as EK or AL.
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will unambiguously increase the level of output in all countries, but more so in
smaller countries).
The model is thus capable (at least qualitatively) to reconcile the substantial
and widespread increase in trade flows over the past 30 years, together with the
substantial decline in macroeconomic volatility during the same period; it is also
consistent with the shoot up in volatility in 2008-2010 and the contraction of
trade amidst the crisis. As the model makes clear, however, openness to trade
does not always lead to lower volatility: The sign and size of the effect can vary
substantially across countries (and, critically, with the set of trading partners).
This might explain why direct evidence on the effect of openness on volatility has
been ambiguous at best. Some studies find that trade decreases volatility (e.g.
Buch, Dropke and Strotmann (2006) for Germany and Burgess and Donaldson
(2010)’s for India), while others find that trade increases it (Easterly and Kraay
(2000)).
The second part of the paper attempts a quantification of the contribution
of trade to the observed changes in volatility since 1970 in a large group of
countries. Using a calibrated version of the model developed above, we try to
answer the question: How much of the changes of volatility since the 1970s can
be attributed to a decline in overall barriers to trade?
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the model and solves
analytically for two special cases, autarky and costless free trade. Section 2.3
presents numerical illustrations. Section 2.4 introduces the data and calibration
and, finally, Section 2.5 discusses our quantitative results.
2.2 Model of trade with aggregate shocks
The model is a basic version of EKAL, with aggregate shocks (stochastic λ).
There is a continuum of goods q(x) which are produced using equipped labour
L (unproduced) and all other produced goods. In particular, each good q(x)
is produced by a Cobb–Douglas production function in L and a CES bundle
of all the intermediate inputs q(x). Aside from being used in the production
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of other goods, the q(x)s can also be directly consumed. As in EK, the utility
derived from consumption takes the same CES form in which the q(x)s enter the
production function. Notice that the q(x)s are therefore both intermediate (when
used in producing other q(x)s) and final goods (when used in consumption). This
is consistent with the national accounts where each sector’s output can be both
used as intermediate by other sectors and as a final good by consumers. All
produced goods q(x) are in principle tradable in international markets (though
the cost for some could be very big – so big that they may not end up being
traded in equilibrium and only produced domestically).
For the sake of exposition, we first discuss the model in autarky and then allow
for international trade. All production is subject to constant returns and we
conduct the analysis of the closed economy in units of the economy’s endowment
Li. For simplicity, we suppress the subindex i in the description of the closed
economy.
2.2.1 Closed economy
Total factor productivity (TFP) varies across intermediate goods; the inverse
of TFP levels, x, are modelled as random variables, independent across goods,
with common density φ. Buyers (who could be final consumers or firms buy-
ing intermediate inputs) purchase individual goods q(x) to maximize the CES
objective:
q =
(∫ ∞
0
q(x)
η−1
η φ(x)dx
) η
η−1
where η > 0 is the elasticity of substitution across goods. The part of the bundle
q that is directly consumed will be denoted c and the part that enters production
of q(x) as intermediate inputs qm. The technology for q(x) is Cobb-Douglas in
the effective labour input s(x) and the bundle of intermediate goods qm defined
above:
q(x) = x−θs(x)βqm(x)1−β
The structure of the economy (for two countries that do not trade with each
other) is shown in Figure 2.1. The cost draws x are common to all producers in
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Figure 2.1: Structure of production in autarky (2 countries)Two countries in Autarky
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the economy. Because of constant returns, the number of producers is indeter-
minate and there is no market power: prices are set at marginal costs; autarky
prices of intermediate goods are hence given by:
p(x) = Bxθwβp1−β
where w is the unit cost of equipped labour, and B = ββ (1− β)(1−β). Following
EKAL, we assume that the density φ follows an exponential distribution with
parameter λ, x ∼ exp(λ) and hence the price of q is given by:
p =
(
λ
∫ ∞
0
p(x)1−ηe−λxdx
) 1
1−η
With some algebra, p(x) and p can be written as multiples of w:
p(x) = A(1−β)/βB1/βxθλ
−θ(1−β)
β w
p = (AB)1/βλ−θ/βw
This is a slightly modified version of the EKAL model, which assumes a
common distribution of productivity for the whole economy (not just manufac-
turing, as in EKAL’s interpretation); in EKAL, there is a separate non-tradable
final good sector (identified with services) with deterministic common technol-
ogy across all countries. As said, we pose no stark distinction between tradables
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Figure 2.2: Structure of production with trade
Trade
q2(x)
q1(x)
q2
c2
q1
c1
L1
L2
14
and non-tradables and rather focus on the average degree of tradability for the
whole economy. This modification requires a slightly different interpretation of
the empirical counterparts of the model, which we will address at the calibration
stage.
2.2.2 International trade
As in EKAL, we assume that intermediate inputs q(x) can be traded interna-
tionally; φ(x) = φ(x1, ..., xN) is now the joint density of goods that have produc-
tivity draws x = (x1, ..., xN) across countries, where the draws are assumed to
be independent across countries: φ(x) = (
∏
λi) exp [−
∑
λixi]. The structure
of production can be then summarized as shown in Figure 2.2.
Delivering a tradable good from country j to country i results in 0 < κij ≤ 1
goods arriving at j; we assume κij ≥ κikκkj for all i, k, j and κii = 1. All costs
incurred are a net loss. In the calibration, the κs will reflect all costs, including
tariffs; so implicitly we adopt the extreme assumption that tariffs are all wasted
(perhaps in political elections). The intermediate bundle for use in country i is
then:
qi =
(∫
RN+
qi(x)
η−1
η φ(x)dx
) η
η−1
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where φ(x) is the probability density function of goods with technology x. The
price level in country i is now given by:
pi(w) = AB
 N∑
j=1
(
wβj pj(w)
1−β
κij
)−1/θ
λj
−θ
which leads to N equations (pi) to be solved in terms of wi, i = 1, ..., N . Defining
dij(w) as the fraction of country i’s total spending Lipiqi that is spent on goods
from country j:
dij(w) = (AB)
−1/θ
(
wβj pj(w)
1−β
pi(w)κij
)−1/θ
λj (2.1)
The trade identity requires that dollar payments for goods flowing out of
country i to the rest of the world must equal payments flowing in country i from
the rest of the world. Allowing for trade imbalance Si and with
∑
j dij = 1,
Lipiqi + Si =
N∑
j=1
Ljpjqjdji(w)
The Cobb-Douglas assumption and the overall resource constraint for the econ-
omy further imply2
Liwi = β(Lipiqi + Si) (2.2)
The trade identity therefore simplifies to
Liwi
β
=
N∑
j=1
(
Ljwj
β
− Sj
)
dji(w) (2.3)
In the original EKAL model, the productivity parameters λs are determinis-
tic, so GDP per capita is a deterministic constant for each country j. As said,
we assume that λs are subject to shocks. In particular, higher realizations of λj
lead to stochastically lower costs x in country j and higher GDPj. Stochasticity
in λj thus imparts stochasticity in GDPj. It is instructive to look at two extreme
cases: 1) complete autarky and 2) costless international trade.
2Derivation of this equation is shown in the Appendix.
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2.2.3 Volatility in autarky
We study the volatility of real GDP, Yi =
Liwi
pi
, measured as the variance of
deviations from mean. Autarkic prices and real GDP are given by:
pi = (AB)
1/βλ
−θ/β
i wi
Yi =
Liwi
pi
= (AB)−1/β λθ/βi Li
Call Zi = λiL
β/θ
i the weighted productivity of the economy (weighted by its
size). Therefore, Yi = (AB)
−1/β Zθ/βi ; denoting by xˆ ≡ ∆ lnx∆t and evaluating
changes around the mean of Zi, we obtain:
Yˆi =
θ
β
Zˆi
And hence volatility is given by:
V ar(Yˆi) =
(
θ
β
)2
V ar(Zˆi)
2.2.4 Volatility with costless trade
With no impediments to trade, κij = 1 and trade imbalances zero, we have:
pj = p = (AB)
1/β
(
N∑
j=1
w
−β/θ
j λj
)−θ/β
(2.4)
Using this in the formula for trade shares (2.1), we have
dji(w) = w
−β/θ
i λi
(
N∑
j=1
w
−β/θ
j λj
)−1
and from the trade identity (2.3) we obtain,
wi =
(
λi
Li
) θ
θ+β
M (2.5)
where M =
(∑n
j=1
Ljwj∑n
k=1 w
−β/θ
k λk
) θ
θ+β
is common to all countries. Therefore3:
Yi = (AB)
−1/β Z
θ
β+θ
i
(
N∑
j=1
Z
θ
θ+β
j
)θ/β
3With (2.4) and (2.5), ratio wipi becomes (AB)
−1/β
(
λi
Li
) θ
β+θ
M
(∑n
j=1
((
λj
Lj
) θ
θ+β
M
)−β/θ
λj
)θ/β
.
Multiplying by Li and simplifying gives the result.
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where Zi = λiL
β/θ
i as before. The log-linear approximation of this is
Yˆi =
θ
β + θ
Zˆi +
θ2
β (β + θ)
N∑
j=1
γjZˆj (2.6)
where γj =
Z¯
θ
β+θ
j∑N
j=1 Z¯
θ
β+θ
j
is the country j′s share in the sum of weighted productiv-
ities of all countries. Rearranging, we have:
Yˆi =
θ
β
(
β + θγi
β + θ
)
Zˆi +
θ2
β (β + θ)
∑
j 6=i
γjZˆj (2.7)
And therefore, volatility in free trade is given by:
V ar(Yˆi) =
(
θ
β
)2{(
β + θγi
β + θ
)2
V ar(Zˆi) +
[
θ
β + θ
]2∑
j 6=i
γ2jV ar(Zˆj)
}
+2
(
θ
β (β + θ)
)2
θ
β + θγi
(β + θ)
∑
j 6=i
γjCov(Zˆj,Zˆi) (2.8)
Compared with the variance in autarky, V ar(Yˆi) =
(
θ
β
)2
V ar(Zˆi), it is clear
that the volatility due to domestic productivity fluctuations, V ar(Zˆi), now re-
ceives a smaller weight because
[
β+θγi
β+θ
]
< 1 since γi < 1. The smaller the
country in terms of its presence in international trade, the smaller the impact of
domestic volatility of shocks, Zˆi, on its GDP, relative to autarky. Openness to
trade, however, exposes the country to other countries’ productivity shocks and
these contribute positively to volatility. The question is then whether the gain
in diversification (given by lower exposure to domestic productivity) is bigger
than the increased exposure to new shocks. The answer depends on the relative
sizes of the countries and the variance-covariance matrix of shocks across them.
If all countries have the same variance V ar(Zˆj) = σ and the Zˆj are uncorrelated,
the volatility of the country in free trade (2.8) becomes:
V ar(Yˆi) =
(
θ
β
)2{[
β + θγi
β + θ
]2
+
[
θ
β + θ
]2∑
j 6=i
γ2j
}
σ
which is lower than the volatility in autarky if an only if:[
β + θγi
β + θ
]2
+
[
θ
β + θ
]2∑
j 6=i
γ2j < 1
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Or, put differently, iff4:
2βθ(γi − 1) + θ2
[∑
j
γ2j − 1
]
< 0 (2.9)
which is always true (recall γj < 1) and
∑N
j=1 γ
2
j ≤ 1. Of course, if other
countries have higher variances or the covariance terms are important, then the
weights countries receive matter and the resulting change in volatility cannot be
signed.
2.3 Numerical illustrations
We simulate the model for many periods (or realizations of λj) and obtain sim-
ulated time series of GDPt,j for different degrees of openness, gauged by trade
costs κ. This exercise is aimed at confirming the intuition on the qualitative
mechanism; later on we attempt a more realistic calibration. We then compute
volatility of each country’s GDP. The qualitative exercise consists of drawing
λ = (λ1...λn) each period from a normal distribution with fixed mean and std
deviation (matching average values in the sample); we choose θ, α, and β as
in AL. We then explore the following (qualitative) experiments: 1) Widespread
decrease in international trade barriers, 2) A Big Country joins the World, and
3) A crisis hits a big country.
2.3.1 Widespread decrease in international trade barriers
We set Ln = 1 and κijt = κt increases uniformly over time from the case of
autarky (κ = 0) to free trade (κ = 1) for i 6= j, with κiit = 1. The upper
panel of Figure 2.3 shows that as κt increases, that is, as trading costs decrease,
volatility decreases; countries are able to diversify uncorrelated country-specific
shocks.
4See the Appendix for proof.
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Figure 2.3: Volatility: uniform decrease in trade barriers
50
60
70
80
90
100
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
kappas t
d  
o
f  G
D
P  
g r
o
w
t h
 
( a u
t a
r k
y  
=
 
1 0
0 %
)
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
Note: Figure shows standard deviation of GDP (in log-deviations) relative to standard
deviation computed when κ = 0 (case of autarky).
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Note: As above. Countries 4 and 5 are big.
If the size of countries is modified to allow for some big countries, Ln =
(1, 1, 1, 3, 3), and all else stays as before, the lower panel of Figure 2.3 clearly
show that the decline in volatility is smaller for big countries.
2.3.2 Big country joins the world
We keep all parameters as before, with Ln = (1, 1, 1, 3, 3) but assume that four
countries are open to trade with each other (constant κij = 0.3 for i, j 6= 5,
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κii = 1) and one of the big countries moves from autarky to free trade with
the remaining countries (κi5t = κ5jt for i, j 6= 5 increases uniformly). The
country that joins experiences a significant decline in volatility, in line with the
conclusions of the above simulations (see Figure 2.4). Other countries also see
some decline in volatility as their trading costs against big country 5 fall; the
decrease is smaller than in previous simulations because their mutual trading
barriers do not change. This simulations suggest that an increase in openness
vis-a`-vis one big country is also consistent with an overall decrease in volatility.
Figure 2.4: Big country joins the world
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Note: Trade costs are fixed for countries 1-4 but uniformly decrease for their trade with
country 5. See Figure 2.3 for further description.
2.3.3 Crisis hits a big country
We keep the parameters as before, Ln = (1, 1, 1, 3, 3), with κij increases uni-
formly over time from autarky to free trade and explore what happens to GDP
if one of the big countries (country 5) experiences a 10% fall in λ. The more
open to trade countries are, the more the countries that were not hit by the
shock suffer the impact the contraction in the big country. (When countries are
completely closed, of course they experience no change in GDP). Conversely, for
the country that suffered the shock, higher openness helps mitigate the impact.
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The more open the country is, the lower the fall in its own GDP. See Figure
2.5 for illustration. The model is therefore consistent with the notion that with
greater trade openness, a large shock to a particular country (e.g. US), can be
more strongly transmitted to other countries through stronger demand linkages.
Figure 2.5: Shock to big country
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Note: Figure shows the % change in GDP that follows after country 5 is hit by a 10% shock to
λ. Trade costs decrease uniformly for all countries; countries 4 and 5 are big compared with
1-3.
2.4 Mapping the model into the data
To identify the key variables from our model with their counterparts in data
we will stick to the convention introduced earlier in this paper and identify the
weighted shocks Zi = λiL
β/θ
i rather than shocks λi and the size of the economy
Li separately. Allowing for this modifications, we get the following modified
equilibrium conditions:
dij = (AB)
−1/θ
(
(Ljwj)
β pj
1−β
piκij
)−1/θ
Zj (2.10)
pi = AB
 n∑
j=1
(
(Ljwj)
β p1−βj
κij
)− 1
θ
Zj
−θ (2.11)
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Liwi
β
=
N∑
j=1
(
Ljwj
β
− Sj
)
dji (2.12)
where B = ββ (1− β)1−β and A = [∫∞
0
e−zzθ(1−η)dz
]1/(1−η)
.
It is of some importance to be clear about the meaning of the words ‘imports’
and ‘exports’, which will play a key role in our measurement exercise. The
quantity flowing from country i to j could be evaluated as the quantity leaving
country i, or as the country reaching country j. Similarly, this quantity could
be valued at country i prices, or at country j prices. We adopt the convention
that ‘imports’ are quantities arriving evaluated at receiving-country prices, while
‘exports’ are quantities departing evaluated at sending country prices. With this
convention, if qij(x) is the quantity of good x leaving country j for country i we
have
Iij =
∫
pi(x)κijqij(x)
whereas the exports from country j to country i are
Eij =
∫
pj(x)qij(x)
Notice that for a good shipped from j to i we have pi(x)κij = pj(x) so our
definitions imply that Iij = Eij. This latter point explains why equation (2.12)
holds. While the left-hand-side describes production in country i, and the right-
hand-side described uses of country i′s output, it is not immediately clear why
this is written in terms of other country’s imports. The answer is that with
our convention the value of other countries imports from i equals the value of
country i exports to them.
For our purposes, it is important that we interpret qi not as a good but as a
shorthand for the value of the bundle of goods q(x) (some produced domestically,
some imported) that are used in domestic production or consumed. Further, pi is
a price index for this basket. Note that there are only N−1 linearly independent
equations in (2.12) so one of the endogenous variables in the system has to be
normalized.
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2.4.1 Identifying the observables
There are four objects in the model that have a fairly clear mapping into observ-
able data. These are: real GDP (in PPP), gross output, imports, and exports.
In turn, these can be combined to compute measures of Lipiqi, Si, dij and that
of β. Starting with real GDP, Liwi is the value of payments received by the
unproduced input, i.e. nominal GDP. Liwi/pi are nominal payments deflated by
the price index, or a measure of real GDP. We show in the Appendix that the
PWT series of constant-price GDP expressed in PPP maps well to our measure
of Liwi/pi.
Lipiqi is the value of all purchases by domestic agents. It is therefore equal
to gross output of the economy plus imports minus exports:
Lipiqi = GNOi − Si
Si is exports minus imports, both evaluated at domestic dollar prices. For-
mally, this is
Si =
∑
k
Eki −
∑
k
Mik
GNOi is the value of total production, or gross output. In the model it is the
quantity GNOi ≡
∫
pi(x)qi(x)dΦ (x). The countries for which we can construct
this series account for 91 percent of world GDP and for 84 percent of world
exports in 2000. For countries for which we are unable to find estimates of total
gross output we estimate the series using data on gross output in industry, value
added, population and year dummies. More details in the Appendix.
dij is the share of goods produced in country j in total demand for goods in
country i. This is defined as
dij =
Iij
Lipiqi
=
Iij
GNOi − Si
with dii implied from the restriction
∑
j dij = 1.
The share of unproduced input in the production of intermediates βi follows
from equation (2.2)
βi =
Liwi
Lipiqi + Si
=
GDPi
GNOi
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In the exercises we report, we use a constant value β = 0.5 for all countries and
years, which is the average found in data.
Finally, we use a value of θ = 0.5. In the model, higher θ implies higher vari-
ance of productivity shocks and increases the potential to exploit comparative
advantage of each country. There is no clear empirical counterpart to this in
existing empirical work. Typically, that work is based on estimates of the elas-
ticity of trade shares with respect to trading costs, where the latter are proxied
as the maximum difference between prices in two countries (see EK). This is not
really the case for our model, in which many goods are not traded in equilibrium
and for which the difference in trading costs cannot be observed. But along the
arguments of Simonovska and Waugh (2009), our point is that existing estimates
of trade elasticities in current empirical work, underestimate the θ in our model.
2.4.2 Computing the unobservables
This section discusses our identification strategy regarding trade costs κ and
shocks Zi = λiL
β/θ
i . We begin by assuming symmetric trade costs κij = κji for
all i, j. From equation (2.10), we have
dji
dii
=
(
pjκji
pi
)1/θ
and
dij
djj
=
(
piκij
pj
)1/θ
Applying κij = κji, we obtain a formula that relates trade costs entirely to the
trade shares defined above.
κji =
(
dij
djj
dji
dii
)θ/2
For illustration, Figure 2.6 plots the values of κijt for i = US and selected trade
partners j.
Next, for i = j, equation (2.10) can again be used to write real aggregate
GDP as:
wiLi
pi
= (AB)−
1
β
(
Zi
dii
)θ/β
(2.13)
Therefore, with a measure of wiLi
pi
, we can retrieve the exogenous process Zi.
Selected series of Zit are reported in Figure 2.7. As we show in the Appendix, the
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Figure 2.6: Trade costs of USA and selected trade partners
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measure of constant-price GDP in international dollars of the PWT corresponds
in our model to the quantity µ
wi,tLi,t
pi,t
so using this in the above expression we
are able to retrieve the composite measure of shocks up to a positive constant
µ common across countries and periods. Once we have the values for Zi and
κij, we can solve the model and we can then ask what fraction of the decline
in volatility can be attributed to openness to trade or the process for Zi. We
give a preliminary answer to the question in the following section, where we
remain agnostic about the properties of trade costs κ. Results using a full
parameterisation of the model are then presented in section 2.5.
2.4.3 Minimalist counterfactual
Having identified real GDP, Yi = Liwi/pi, and trade shares dij, we can use
the equilibrium equation (2.13) in a logarithmic form to get a sense of the
contribution of trade to the change in volatility. Let us denote by zit the natural
logarithm of shocks Zit and yit the log of total (not per capita) real GDP of
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Figure 2.7: Shocks Z for selected countries and years
country i in year t:
yit = const +
θ
β
(zit − ln dii,t)
We can then decompose GDP volatility as
Var (y˜i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2)
=
(
θ
β
)2 Var(z˜i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3)
+ Var(ln d˜ii)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(4)
−2 Cov(z˜i, ln d˜ii)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(5)
 (2.14)
where the tildes indicate growth rates and the numbers below the expressions
link each term with the corresponding column in Table 2.1.
Trade policy can change the last two terms in the brackets, but not the first
(at least not directly). We estimate each of the three terms before and after
the mid 1980s, and study how they contributed to the decline in volatility in
different countries. This is a decomposition, so all volatility will be accounted
for – the residual Var(zi) will pick up all the slack. Table 2.1 summarizes the
results. The last column of the table gives the relative importance of the joint
contribution of the change in V ar(ln d˜ii) and Cov(z˜i, ln d˜ii) in the total change
in V ar(y˜i).
There are two lessons to take from this exercise. First, the change in volatility
of variables associated with trade has in most cases contributed to greater stabil-
ity of economic output. Secondly, the impact has varied widely among countries
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Table 2.1: Minimalist counterfactual: Change in volatility from 1970-1984
Note: The table presents a decomposition of the volatility of GDP growth into terms related
to unobservable shocks and terms related to trade policy. It shows how the respective terms
changed between two periods 1970-1984 and 1985-2006. The last column gives the share of
the change in volatility that can broadly be accounted for by terms related to trade. See
equation (2.14).
and has been especially strong in small open economies like Belgium, Ireland
and the Netherlands. Large developed countries, with the exception of Japan,
have benefited less because their reliance on trade is substantially smaller. We
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will seek to confirm these preliminary findings in the following section.
2.5 Counterfactual simulations
Suppose the level of openness from 1970-1984 had not changed in the post 1985
period. How would have volatility changed, given the lower degree of openness
in the latter period? In this exercise, we use the series of shocks Zit and trade
costs κijt as measured above and simulate two scenarios. In the baseline, we let
the properties of shocks and the level of openness to evolve as in the data while
in the counterfactual exercise the level of openness stays at the pre-1984 level
(shocks are as in the baseline).
In order for our results not to be driven by a particular realization of shocks
we compute this exercise with artificially generated series of shocks and do so
many times (5000). Disturbances Zit are modelled as an AR(1) process in log
deviations around country-specific trends (HP trends). The latter are taken as
given in all simulations. What differs across simulations are the stationary in-
novations around trends, which are bootstrapped from Zit computed in the pre-
vious section. We thus preserve the stochastic properties of our detrended series
of Zit in each period (1970-1984 and 1985-2006).
5 We have experimented with
preserving the contemporaneous covariance structure in shocks across countries
but this distinction has not proved quantitatively important.
Our trade costs κ are derived from bilateral trade data. Since our point is
to show how a general increase in trade openness could have affected volatility
of GDP growth, we abstract from the observed volatility in the series of κ and
take a representative value for each pair ij and each period (1970 for the first
and 2000 for the latter) and keep these values constant within periods. In the
counterfactual exercise we keep the 1970 value constant both within and between
periods. When the 1970 value of trade costs was missing for a particular pair of
countries because of the lack of bilateral trade data, we used the earliest recorded
5The problem of initial values was addressed by simulating long series for each period and
removing the redundant years at the beginning of the series.
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value instead. Trade imbalances are treated as exogenous in the original EKAL
model and we therefore ignore them in the simulations below.
With a newly generated series of Zit and the representative values of κijt we
solve the model and compute the new series for GDP, detrend it by using the HP
filter (separately for each period) and compute the relative change in volatility
between the first and second period.
Table 2.2 summarizes our results. The first column in the table shows the
change in volatility that would have prevailed under the counterfactual exercise
(trade costs are kept at the 1970 level) and the second column reports the results
of the baseline exercise, when the representative value of trade costs changes
between periods. For illustration, these values are also shown in Figure 2.8. A
comparison of these two exercises shown in the last two columns of the table
gives the contribution of trade costs (the only variable that differs between the
two reported scenarios) to volatility. The main finding is that in all countries
lower trade costs, i.e. increased trade, contributed to lower volatility than it
would have been otherwise.
Even though the quantitative significance of the diversification channel seems
to be small, averaging to about 3 percentage points in fall in volatility, there
are large difference across countries. The countries that seem to have benefited
most from greater openness were, in that order, Ireland, Belgium, Korea and the
Netherlands – all small open economies. At the other end of the spectrum there
were larger or less diversified countries Australia, Colombia, India and Japan.
Comparing the relative contribution of openness to volatility, there is strong
correlation (0.70) between the contribution of trade to the change in volatility
(column |(1 − 2)|) of Table 2.2 and the change in average trade costs for each
country6, confirming our intuition that countries where trade expanded most
have experienced greatest decreases in volatility.
Returning to the minimalist counterfactual introduced in the previous sec-
tion, we find negative correlation (-0.44) between the sum of the two channels we
ascribed to trade policy (columns 4 and 5 in Table 2.1) and the change in volatil-
6Average trade costs of country i are computed as averages of κijt over j in each period.
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Figure 2.8: Change in volatility 70-84 v 85-06, counterfactual and baseline
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Note: The figure shows the change in volatility of GDP growth rate between the two periods
with (baseline) and without (counterfactual) changes in trade costs between periods. Country
codes refer to countries listed in Table 2.2. Finland is not shown due to a different scale.
ity computed in this exercise, which we take as a sign of consistency between the
volatility decomposition exercise and the numerical simulations presented here.
2.6 Conclusions
This chapter revisits a question that keeps coming up in policy discussions of
the pros and cons of trade liberalizations, particularly in low income economies:
How does openness to trade affect GDP volatility? We develop a general equi-
librium quantitative framework to formalise the diversification channel in which
trade acts as a hedge against shocks to individual suppliers. The logic of the
mechanism we study is as follows. When the production process relies on differ-
ent inputs that can be sourced from different countries, a shock to a particular
supplier (a domestic or foreign one) is easier to accommodate because the pool
of potential suppliers is wider and the potential for diversification of cost shocks
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is greater. The channel is the stronger the lower are trade costs that agents face
when trading goods across countries.
We derive formulas for the variance of GDP growth in autarky and free trade
and show, first, that trade directly decreases volatility because domestic pro-
ductivity fluctuations receive smaller weight with free trade than in autarky.
Secondly, we show that trade exposes the country to other countries’ produc-
tivity shocks and these contribute positively to volatility. The overall effect
on volatility therefore depends on the relative sizes of the countries and the
variance-covariance matrix of shocks across them.
Using data on international trade, GDP and gross output we use the model
to quantify the contribution of trade to the changes in volatility since 1970 and
find that in all countries lower trade costs generated lower volatility than it
would have been otherwise. The quantitative significance of the diversification
channel seems to be small on average but its role rises in small open economies,
in line with the qualitative predictions of the model. One reason why the channel
does not find larger support in data is that costs of across-the-border trade we
are able to identify are huge compared with cost-less domestic trade. Stylised
illustrations presented in section 2.3 indicate that greatest gains (in terms of
lower volatility) from openness accrue only when trade openness reaches much
larger a degree than is currently the case for most economies.
The framework we study in this paper investigates one of the two main mech-
anisms that can mediate the relationship between trade and volatility. The other
mechanism emphasises the role of sectoral shocks and supports the view that as
countries becomes specialised in sectors according to their comparative advan-
tage, they become increasingly vulnerable to shocks in that particular sectors.
In our future research, we plan to nest the two mechanisms in the framework
used here and assess their quantitative importance.
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Table 2.2: Change in volatility 70-84 v 85-06, counterfactual and baseline
Note: The table shows changes in volatility of GDP growth rates between the two periods. In
the baseline, trade costs κ are allowed to change between periods (they take fixed values in
each period), while in the other scenario (‘counterfactual’) trade costs in 1985-2006 are kept
at their 1970-1984 values.
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Derivation of equation (2.2)
Equation (2.2), stating that Liwi = β(Lipiqi + Si) can more intuitively be ex-
pressed as follows (add Lipiqi and Si to both sides and rearrange)
Lipiqi = (1− β) (Lipiqi + Si) + Liwi − Si
where on the left hand side is the total value of domestic spending on goods,
which are partly expended on intermediates and partly in the form of final
demand for goods. To add intuition to the first term on the right-hand side (at
the cost of loose notation), notice that the total payments to domestic producers
of individual goods originate either from domestic or foreign sources. In per
capita terms we have∫
p (x) q (x) dΦ (x) =
∫
sold domestically
p (x) q (x) dΦ (x) +
∫
exported
p (x) q (x) dΦ (x)
Next, the per capita spending on goods piqi accrues partly to domestic pro-
ducers and partly to foreigners:
piqi =
∫
bought domestically
p (x) q (x) dΦ (x) +
∫
imported
p (x) q (x) dΦ (x)
Now, obviously, the value of goods sold and bought domestically will be
identical in the equilibrium so combining these two lines we arrive in∫
p (x) q (x) dΦ (x) = piqi +
∫
exported
p (x) q (x) dΦ (x)−
∫
imported
p (x) q (x) dΦ (x)
Finally, perfect competition and the Cobb-Douglas formulation implies that
1− β of this expression accrues to the produced input, i.e. to intermediates. In
aggregate terms this becomes (1− β) (Lipiqi + Si).
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2.A.2 Derivation of equation (2.9): volatility with free
trade
Start with the original condition that shows that GDP under costless trade less
is volatile than under autarky.
(β + θγi)
2 + θ2
∑N
j 6=i γ
2
j
(β + θ)2
< 1
The following steps, first, expand the numerator and adds terms; the second
line completes the square and collect several terms. Finally, the last line moves
(θγi)
2 to the expression in square brackets (note the change of the index under
the summation sign) and cancels common terms. This inequality holds since
γi < 1 for all i.
β2 + (θγi)
2 + 2βθγi + θ
2 − θ2 + 2βθ − 2βθ + θ2∑Nj 6=i γ2j
(β + θ)2
< 1
(β + θ)2 + (θγi)
2 + 2βθ(γi − 1) + θ2
[∑N
j 6=i γ
2
j − 1
]
(β + θ)2
< 1
2βθ(γi − 1) + θ2
[
N∑
j=i
γ2j − 1
]
< 0
2.A.3 Proof that Liwi/pi maps to constant-price GDP in
PPP
It is instructive to start with variable Pi that in the Penn World Tables denotes
the price level of GDP, or more precisely the USD value of local expenditures
over expenditures evaluated in international prices. While the PWT variables
are originally defined (and computed) in terms of expenditures and relative
prices, it is possible to cast them in terms of prices and quantities as follows:
Pi =
∑
g pg,i qg,i∑
g pg qg,i
with pg,i and qq,i represent the USD price and quantity of good g respectively
and pg is the price of the same good in an international currency. Index g
represents spending groups (basic headings in the PWT terminology), which
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are constructed in a way that the sum of these expenditure groups adds to
total GDP. One of these groups are net exports, valuation of which follows the
assumption that
pnx,i qnx,i = pnx qnx,i = Si
where Si is in USD.
In our model, consumers buy all individual goods q(x) and bundle them using
the CES aggregator in a final good qf . Hence, a PWT statistician would be able
to sample only from this one final good in each country and the quantity Pi
measured becomes
Pi,t =
pi,t qf,i,t Li,t + Si,t
pt qf,i,t Li,t + Si,t
Setting PUS,t = 100 as is the case in the PWT implies pt = pUS,t/100 for all
t. The denominator of Pi,t is the current-price GDP in international prices
CGDPi,t = pUS,t qf,i,t Li,t + Si,t
and the real-price (Laspeyres) GDP in international prices is defined as
RGDPi,t = pUS,T qf,i,t Li,t + S
T
i,t
where the last term captures real net exports in year t valued at prices from
base year T . Using the income-expenditure identity Li,twi,t = pi,t qf,i,t Li,t + Si,t
and simple algebra we get
RGDPi,t = pUS,T
(Li,twi,t − Si,t)
pi,t
+ STi,t
= pUS,T
Li,twi,t
pi,t
− pUS,T
pi,t
Si,t + S
T
i,t
= pUS,T
Li,twi,t
pi,t
− pUS,T
pi,T
pi,T
pi,t
Si,t + S
T
i,t
= pUS,T
Li,twi,t
pi,t
+ STi,t
(
1− pUS,T
pi,T
)
≈ µLi,twi,t
pi,t
The last equality follows the PWT convention of valuing net exports by the
price index of domestic absorption for years other than the base year. By drop-
ping the last term in the approximation we assume that changes in real net
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exports are small for most countries relative to domestic absorption. Given the
weight attached to STi,t this assumption will be of importance only for countries
with price level far off the US one in the base year.
This equation allows us to identify real GDP computed from our model with
variable RGDPi,t as measured by the PWT, up to a constant common to all
countries and all years.
2.A.4 Data description
Our sample consists from 24 countries, which we call the core countries, for
which we were able to collect a sufficient amount of data with none or very
little estimation. Other countries, for which less data are available and more
estimation was needed, form the rest of the world (ROW). The choice of the
core countries was dictated mainly by the availability of data for total gross
output; they include: the U.S., Mexico and Canada, Australia, Asia is repre-
sented by China, Japan, Korea and India, South America by Colombia, and the
rest are advanced European countries: the U.K., a composite of France and its
oversee departments, Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, a composite of Belgium
and Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Greece,
Austria and Ireland. While some important countries appear only in our ROW
variable (most notably Brazil, Russia, Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia and oil ex-
porters), the selection of core countries is sufficiently representative in terms of
geographic location and the share in the world trade and GDP. The time period
we study covers years from 1970 to 2006. We focus on annual data.
The strategy regarding the rest of the world was to use the GDP and popu-
lation data for those for which we were able to find a full series, look for their
individual total output, estimate it when missing and subsequently aggregate.
Due to trade data availability, the following groups of countries were merged into
a single entity each: former Soviet Union, countries forming the South African
Common Customs Area and former Czechoslovakia.
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To identify variables in the model three main groups of data were needed.
First, we use the PWT variable RGDP to identify real GDP. The series is in
international dollars and is available for most countries in the world. Next, we
use gross output data, obtained from the EU KLEMS database, the UN database
and other sources. Finally, the basis for our trade data is the IMF DOTS
database. The rest of the section describes our data sources and estimation
methods.
Real GDP: Source is PWT 6.3, variable RGDPL, GDP per capita, inter-
national prices, constant prices of 2005, Laspeyres index. Aggregate GDP is
a product of RGDPL and variable POP defined below. Real GDP for former
USSR and Czechoslovakia required special attention:
• Former Czechoslovakia: for 1990-06 the source is PWT 6.3, sum of the
GDP series for the Slovak and Czech Republics; for 1970-89 data are from
PWT 5.6 (the growth rate of the data from PWT 5.6 was applied starting
with the overlapping year 1990).
• Former USSR: for 1994-2006 the source is PWT 6.3, sum of the GDP series
for individual post-soviet republics; for 1989/90-93 when data in PWT 6.3
are missing, the growth rate of individual countries from the World Bank,
WDI (April 2010), GDP in constant 2005 international dollar was used;
in 1989 for 5 republics neither the WB data were available so the growth
rate of Russia was applied; for 1970-1988 the growth rate from PWT 5.6
was used starting in the overlapping year 1989.
Gross Output: With the exception of India and China, the sources of data
for total gross output in core countries are the same that were use to construct
output in industry and are defined below. Total output of India (1970-1998)
and China (whole series) is not available. We use the available data for output
in industry and estimate the missing part, output in services, by regressing
output in services for the remaining core countries on their GDP, output in
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industry, population, CGDP from the PWT, value added in services and a set
of year dummies. Output in services and value added in services was obtained
as a difference between the respective values for the aggregate economy and
industry. The estimation technique was a Poisson regression adapted from Silva
and Tenreyro (2006). For India, the missing years were generated using the
growth rate of the estimated series.
Gross output data for the rest of the world come from UN Data. Missing
values were generated using the growth rate of estimated output (a Poisson
regression of total output on GDP and population). Individual country data
(after conversion to USD) were then aggregated to the ROW. The series we
obtain has a well behaved output/GDP ratio for all years.
Trade Data: We use bilateral imports and exports from 1970 to 2006 from
the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics kindly provided by Julian Di Giovanni.
The DOTS reports bilateral gross trade flows. An import data point is Iij, or
the dollar value of imports by country i from country j, at country i prices.
There are minor discrepancies between the data and the conventions adopted
in the paper, which we do not address. One problem is that imports are eval-
uated gross of transport costs but not gross of tariffs. Hence we underestimate
the quantity
∫
pi(x)qij(x)dΦ (x) for every j 6= i. Another possible problem is
that the import data contains re-imports and the export data re-exports.
Auxiliary Data:
• CGDP: GDP per capita, international prices, current prices, PWT 6.3.
Converted to aggregate GDP by multiplying by total population.
• GDP in local currency: World Bank, World Development Indicators (April
2010), variable GDP in current LCU. Data for the former Soviet Union
and Czechoslovakia come from the UN National Account Main Aggregates
Database. Data are available for the currently dissolved entities until 1990
and for their successors states from 1990 onwards. Year 1990 is available
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for both series. The post-1990 values were computed as a sum of GDP in
USD of the successor states and the pre-1990 totals were scaled to match
the composite 1990 value.
• Population: PWT 6.3, variable POP.
• Exchange rate: World Bank, World Development Indicators (April 2010),
variable Official Exchange Rate defined as LCU per US$, period average.
This series was used to convert total output and GDP in local currency
units to USD. When currency reported by the WB was not consistent with
the series used in the sample, the PWT exchange rate was used.
• Value added in industry and total value added is primarily derived from the
EU KLEMS database (November 2009 and March 2008 edition). Industry
covers the same sectors as defined in output in industry. When unavailable,
other sources were used and linked to the main series by means of growth
rates: UN Data (India, Mexico, Norway and Colombia), OECD STAN
(Japan), Canadian Statistical Office’s, Statistical Yearbooks of China.
• Output in industry is defined as the sum of output in agriculture, hunt-
ing, forestry and fishing, mining and quarrying, and manufacturing and
is measured in units of local currency. For most countries, the source
is the EU KLEMS database (November 2009 and March 2008 editions),
variable gross output at current basic prices. When missing, the follow-
ing sources were used: UN Data (Norway and Colombia), OECD STAN
(Japan), Canadian Statistical Office’s (Canada), Statistical Yearbooks of
China, Statistical Office of India, INEGI (Mexico). Two remarks are due
with respect to China and India.
– Regarding Chinese data, the primary concern was the methodological
change initiated around 1998, when China stopped reporting total
industrial output and limited the coverage to industrial output of
firms with annual sales above 5m yuan (USD 625 000). The sectoral
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coverage remained the same in both series. There were 5 years of
overlapping data of both series over which the share of the 5m+ firms
on total output decreased from 66 to 57 percent. The chosen approach
to align both series was to take the levels of output from the pre-1999
series (output of all firms) and apply the growth rate of output of 5m+
firms in the post-1999 period. This procedure probably exaggerates
the level of output in the last seven years and leads to an enormous
increase in the output/GDP in industry ratio (from 3.5 in 1999 to
6.0 in 2006). Our conjecture is that the ratio would be less steep
if the denominator was value added in industry (unavailable on a
comparable basis) because the GDP figure includes net taxes, which
might take large negative values. Output in industry of all firms
reflects the 1995 adjustment with the latest economic census.
– The Statistical Office of India reports years 1999-2006 on the SNA93
basis. Earlier years were obtained using growth rates of sectoral
output as defined in their ‘Back Series’ database. The main issue
with India was the large share of ‘unregistered’ manufacturing that
is reported in the SNA93 series but missing in the pre-1999 data.
The ‘unregistered’ manufacturing covers firms employing less than
10 workers and is also referred to as the informal or unorganized sec-
tor. We reconstructed the total manufacturing output using the as-
sumption that the share of registered manufacturing output in total
manufacturing output mirrors the share of value added of the reg-
istered manufacturing sector in total value added in manufacturing
(available from the ‘Back Series’ database).
3Optimal Monetary Policy with
Industry and Services
3.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates what measure of inflation should a welfare-minded
central bank target in an economy with nominal price and wage rigidities and
two sectors that differ in the share of labour used in production. The welfare-
theoretic analysis of monetary policy had traditionally focused at reducing the
‘shoe-leather’ costs associated with the opportunity costs of holding money. Fol-
lowing the publication of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), researchers started
to study also other sources of frictions, most notably those brought about by
delays in the adjustment of nominal prices contracts. For instance, Woodford
(2003) presents a framework in which asynchronous price adjustment that leads
to discrepancies between relative prices causes an inefficient allocation of re-
sources. A major advantage of this approach compared to the traditional one is
that it provides specific guidelines to the central bank regarding the measure of
inflation and/or output gap to target in order to maximise utility of economic
agents.
The issue of an optimal target of a monetary authority has received a con-
siderable interest in the literature. In a multi-sector or multi-country setting,
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Aoki (2001) proved that for an economy where one sector exhibits nominal fric-
tions while the other sector’s prices are perfectly flexible the optimal policy is
to stabilise inflation in the sticky-price sector. In this particular framework, the
monetary policy that follows only one of the two sectors also helps establish the
efficient outcome for the entire economy. Aoki’s work justifies the tendency of
central banks to target the “core” inflation (an index that excludes goods whose
prices change frequently) instead of targeting an overall measure of prices. Be-
nigno (2004) extends this result to the open-economy setting and concludes that
if the central bank can commit itself to inflation-targeting policies, it is optimal
to give higher weight to the country/sector with greater nominal rigidities (see
Proposition 4 in Benigno, 2004).
Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) and Erceg and Levin (2006) study the
implications for monetary policy of nominal frictions in the labour market cou-
pled with differences in the durability of output. The former paper shows that
staggered price and wage contracts in a one-sector economy imply a trade-off
between the goals of inflation and output gap stabilisation. Erceg and Levin
(2006), which is the work most related to this chapter, then implement the same
features in a two-sector setting. The key lesson that emerges from their study
is that factors unrelated to the source of nominal frictions (durability of out-
put) can affect the design of optimal policy. The monetary authority in their
model prefers to give unequal weight to the two sectors even though the nominal
frictions are equally severe across sectors. In particular, the authors show that
the optimal inflation target in this economy is biased toward the durable goods
sector.
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the monetary-policy implications of
another important and highly realistic facet of the economic landscape, namely
of the differences in the relative use of labour in the production process. My
model economy is closed and consists of two sectors. For the sake of illustra-
tion, the relatively labour-intensive one is labelled ‘services’ while the relatively
capital-intensive one is labelled ‘manufacturing’. I abstract from all other dif-
ferences between the two sectors. I show that a central bank operating under
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the inflation-targeting regime finds it optimal in this specific environment to
target an inflation index that puts systematically higher weight on inflation in
manufacturing. The result originates in different slopes of the marginal product
of labour in the two sectors. The marginal product of labour is steeper in the
capital-intensive sector, implying that a given change in output would require
a greater percentage change in the labour input compared with the labour-
intensive one.
The key assumptions that underlie this result are imperfect competition in the
goods market and nominal price rigidities. Imperfect competition makes firms
supply differentiated goods that are all purchased in the equilibrium. Nomi-
nal rigidities then create a non-degenerate dispersion in individual prices and
outputs in both sectors and lead to inefficiencies that can be addressed by the
toolkit of the monetary authority. Assuming goods weigh equally in terms of
utility, note that a fictitious social planner entrusted by the task to produce a
given level of the consumption basket would spread the production of individ-
ual goods equally among all firms. However, such an outcome is infeasible in a
market economy if prices of the individual goods differ from each other. Limited
substitutability then implies that there is more output (and therefore labour)
needed to generate the same amount of utility compared with the equilibrium
of the social planner. The faster the marginal product falls with the increase in
output the more of the labour input is needed to produce the additional level of
output and the greater are welfare losses compared with the efficient allocation.
A welfare-maximizing central bank therefore strives to limit the dispersion in
output of individual goods in manufacturing more emphatically than in services.
It does so by reducing the incentives to alter prices after a shock hits the man-
ufacturing sector, which substantiates greater weight of manufacturing inflation
in the optimal inflation index.
In terms of the modelling approach, this paper builds on the analysis of Erceg
et al. (2000), who extend the welfare-theoretical approach to monetary policy
by allowing for the presence of two production factors, and generalizes it to
consider the implications of different labour intensities. Another (and rather
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technical) point of departure from Erceg et al. (2000) is that the analysis in the
present paper is embedded in a framework with a utility function that is not
separable in sectoral bundles; as was shown in Aoki (2001) and Benigno (2004)
this feature is not only more realistic but also allows for richer implications for
the conduct of monetary policy.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the economy and
defines the equilibrium. Section 3.3 presents log-linear versions of the key model
equations and solves for the equilibrium under flexible prices and wages. Finally,
section 3.4 derives the social welfare function and discusses the optimal structure
of the inflation index.
3.2 Model
The model is a variant of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) with imperfect com-
petition and Calvo-style (random duration) price contracts in goods markets. It
follows Erceg and Levin’s (2000) strategy to incorporate random-duration nomi-
nal wage contracts and production factors into the model. On top of that, factor
intensities are allowed to differ across sectors. The utility function is such that
the structural equations of the model depend on relative prices.
The economy consists of two sectors that differ in their relative use of labour
and capital. Manufacturing is assumed to be the relatively capital-intensive
sector and services the relatively labour-intensive one (note that this is only a
rough description of reality, because a heavy use of capital is typical for some
services too, for example in telecommunications). Both factors are free to move
within a sector but are sufficiently specialized so that they cannot be used in-
terchangeably in both sectors. Similarly as Erceg et al. (2000) and Erceg and
Levin (2006), this model abstracts from endogenous capital accumulation. The
following part of the section describes the behaviour of households and firms,
respectively, in the model.
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3.2.1 Households
The decision makers in this economy are two sets of identical infinitely-lived
and fully forward-looking households, each of measure one, that supply their
work in the labour markets in one of the two sectors. They consume an index
of consumption goods produced in both sectors, which is represented by the
Cobb-Douglas aggregator (3.1). The aggregator exhibits unitary elasticity of
substitution between the sectoral bundles and the shares of sectoral consump-
tion bundles are given by ψm and ψs, which add to one. Households allocate their
expenditure in a cost-minimizing way according to prices of the respective sec-
toral bundles (3.2) so that the aggregate price index corresponding to one unit of
their aggregate consumption is given by (3.3). Note that the household-specific
subscripts are suppressed from reasons that will shortly become apparent.
Ct ≡
Cψmm,tC
ψs
s,t
(ψm)
ψm (ψs)
ψs
(3.1)
Cj,t=
[
Pj,t
Pt
]−1
ψj Ct, j ∈ {m, s} (3.2)
Pt = P
ψm
m,tP
ψs
s,t (3.3)
At the sectoral level, households consume all the differentiated goods pro-
duced in each sector but the degree of substitution between them, θ, is higher
than the one between goods produced in different sectors. Their preferences over
the continuum of goods are captured by the Dixit-Stiglitz utility function (3.4),
in which each good carries equal weight. Similarly as above, optimality condi-
tions imply demand functions (3.5) and the price index of the sectoral basket
(3.6).
Cj,t ≡
[∫ 1
0
Cj,t (f)
θ−1
θ df
] θ
θ−1
, θ > 1 (3.4)
Cj,t (f) =
[
Pj,t (f)
Pj,t
]−θ
Cj,t (3.5)
Pj,t =
[∫ 1
0
Pj,t (f)
1−θ df
] 1
1−θ
(3.6)
Apart from consumption, each household has to determine the amount of
work it wishes to supply in the labour market, over which it is endowed with
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monopolistic power; hours worked by different households are therefore imperfect
substitutes. Each firm in the production process employs a labour index Lj,t that
is composed of hours worked by all households in the sector. It is useful to think
of the labour aggregation process as if it was carried out by a fictitious labour
agency that observes all the wage contracts in force and allocates workers to the
composite labour index in a cost-minimizing fashion described by the demand
functions (3.8). Subsequently, the agency passes the index at cost Wj,t, defined
in (3.9), to all firms operating in the sector. The agency allows workers to adjust
the wage contracts only after passing of a random interval of time (Calvo-style
wage contacts).
Lj,t ≡
[∫ 1
0
Lj,t (h)
φ−1
φ dh
] φ
φ−1
, φ > 1 (3.7)
Lj,t (h) =
[
Wj,t (h)
Wj,t
]−φ
Lj,t (3.8)
Wj,t =
[∫ 1
0
Wj,t (h)
1−φ dh
] 1
1−φ
(3.9)
With these preliminary definitions in mind we are now ready to define the
households’ decision problem. Their objective at time t is to maximise a time-
separable utility function composed of the consumption index (3.1), the hours
worked Lj,t and money balances Mj,t, which provide liquidity services. The
objective function takes the following form
Et
∞∑
i=0
βi
{
U [Ct+i (h)] + V [Lj,t+i (h)] + M
[
Mj,t+i (h)
Pt+i
]}
(3.10)
where the operator Et denotes expectations over all possible future states of
nature conditional on the information available in t and β is a discount factor.
Apart from nominal money balances, one-period state-contingent bonds Bt,s are
traded in the economy. They do not enter utility but serve as a risk sharing de-
vice. The price of a financial claim to one unit of nominal income in a particular
state of nature s in the next period is δt,t+1,s, which will be henceforth referred
to as the stochastic discount factor. If the central bank in this economy supplies
risk-less one-period bonds then it follows that the gross nominal interest rate on
these assets at t satisfies Rt = [Etδt,t+1]
−1.
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The period budget constraint then imposes that household’s h labour income
and wealth at the beginning of period t must be spent either on consumption,
lump-sum taxes or purchases of financial assets.
PtCt(h) +Mj,t+1(h) +
∫
s
δt,t+1,sBt+1,s(h)
≤ (1 + gw)Wj,t(h)Lj,t(h) +Mj,t(h) +Bt(h) +Ht(h)− Tt(h) (3.11)
where Ht (h) denotes household’s aliquot share in firms’ profits and also includes
the income from administering the fixed level of capital in that sector. Note
that the role of government in this economy is limited to the collection of lump-
sum taxes that are spent on price-subsidies to firms gp and wage subsidies to
households gw. The idea behind these subsidies is to make the central bank
solely responsible for distortions that originates from nominal rigidities, while
the government applies transfer schemes to eliminate the inefficiencies related
to monopolistic markets.
The first-order conditions of this problem with respect to consumption and
bonds are given by
UC [Ct (h)] = ΛtPt (3.12)
R−1t = βEt
Λt+1
Λt
(3.13)
Assuming that the central bank carries out its monetary policy by setting the
nominal interest rate, Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) show that it is safe to
neglect the optimality condition for real money balances. The additional first-
order condition would only pin down the nominal level of money. Due to the
assumption of complete markets, the marginal utility of income, Λt, is common
to all households so that they choose an identical level of consumption.
Finally, let us turn attention to the decision problem of households adjusting
their wage contracts in period t. Since the labour agency allows to re-optimise
the nominal wage only to a fraction (1− η) of randomly selected workers each
period, an individual worker therefore takes into account that he or she might
not be able to change the wage in the subsequent periods. The worker will thus
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maximise the utility function (3.10) with a discount factor (βη), which reflects
the expected length of the new wage contract, subject to the budget constraints
(3.11) and the labour demands (3.8), which are taken into account because
the worker is a monopolistic provider of L (h). Assuming that the government
provides the worker with subsidy gw that eliminates the monopolistic distortions,
the first order condition with respect to wages is given by
Et
∞∑
i=0
(β η)iW φj,t+iLj,t+i
{
VL
[(
Wj,t(h)
Wj,t+i
)−φ
Lj,t+i
]
+ Λt+iWj,t(h)
}
= 0 (3.14)
Because this equation is independent of all worker-specific variables but wages
it follows that all workers adjusting their wage in a given period will set them
at an identical level, W ∗j,t, which greatly simplifies the sectoral wage index (3.9).
It can be shown (as in Calvo, 1983) that it becomes
W 1−φj,t = ηW
1−φ
j,t−1 + (1− η)W ∗ 1−φj,t (3.15)
Workers, who are unable to adjust wages in the given period, commit them-
selves in the wage contract to provide their variety of labour at the wage rate
set in preceding periods according to the labour demands (3.8). Note that un-
der flexible prices, the optimality conditions for consumption (3.12) and labour
(3.14) imply that wages must equal to the marginal rate of substitution, which
is defined here for future reference:
MRSj,t = −VL(Lj,t)
UC(Ct)
(3.16)
3.2.2 Firms
Each individual firm is a monopolistic supplier of the differentiated good Yj,t (f),
which it produces by means of the Cobb-Douglas technology (3.17) using capital
services and the index of labour hours described above. In order to investigate
the implications of different labour intensity for the conduct of monetary policy,
labour intensity is allowed to differ across sectors with αm ≥ αs. I further assume
that all firms operating in a sector are subject to common shocks that jointly
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affect the productivity of both production factors in the sector. The production
function is defined by
Yj,t (f) = Aj,tKj,t (f)
αj Lj,t (f)
1−αj (3.17)
Similarly to households, firms sign Calvo-style nominal price contracts that
allow them to change their prices only at exogenous random intervals. Specif-
ically, a fraction (1− ) of firms gets to choose a new price at the beginning
of a quarter. The probability of re-adjusting the price in any given period is
independent of time that has elapsed since the firm set its price the last time.
The decision problem of firm f therefore consists of maximizing the present dis-
counted value of expected profits achieved under the assumption that the price
set in t would, with probability , apply also in the future, subject to the demand
functions for its particular variety given by (3.2) and (3.5). Taking into account
the market clearing conditions Yj,t = 2Cj,t and assuming that the government
applies production subsidy gp to offset monopolistic mark-ups, the first-order
condition of this problem is
Et
∞∑
i=0
iδt,t+i
(
Pj,t (f)
Pj,t+i
)−θ (
Pj,t+i
Pt+i
)−1
Yt+i (Pj,t (f)−MCj,t+i) = 0 (3.18)
Note that in the limiting case of fully flexible prices when  = 0 this equation
imposes that prices equal the cost MCj,t arising from production of one unit of
Yj,t (f).
Firms not able to re-set their prices in the period solve the following minimi-
sation problem
min
K,L
P kj,tKj,t (f) +Wj,tLj,t (f) s.t. Aj,tKj,t (f)
αj Lj,t (f)
1−αj ≥ 1 (3.19)
the first-order conditions of which imply, first, that all firms in a sector employ
identical capital-labour ratios and, secondly, that marginal costs can be ex-
pressed as a weighted average of factor prices divided by the productivity shock
Aj,t or, alternatively, as a ratio of wages and the marginal product of labour.
MCj,t =
P
k,αj
j,t W
1−αj
j,t
Aj,t α
αj
j (1− αj)1−αj
=
Wj,t
(1− αj)Aj,tKαjj L−αjj,t
=
Wj,t
MPLj,t
(3.20)
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Writing marginal costs in terms of wages and the marginal product of labour
simplifies the solution of the model because it allows to abstract from computing
the price of capital (note that the sectoral level of capital is fixed). Since marginal
costs are independent of firm-specific variables, it follows from the price setting
equation (3.18) that all firms adjusting their prices in a given period will choose
the same price P ∗j,t. The sectoral price index (3.6) therefore simplifies to
P 1−θj,t = P
1−θ
j,t−1 + (1− )P ∗ 1−θj,t (3.21)
The last equation states that prices in force in period t can be decomposed
into a fraction  of price contracts passed from the previous period and a fraction
(1− ) of newly adjusted prices. To complete the description of the block of firms
it remains to define the sectoral level of output that corresponds to the sectoral
labour index Lj,t, used in the equations above, and the fixed level of capital in
a sector. Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2005) show that it is given by
Yj,t = Aj,tK
αj
j L
1−αj
j,t (DPj,t)
−1 (3.22)
DPj,t ≡
∫ 1
0
[
Pj,t (f)
Pj,t
]−θ
df
where the last term reflects price dispersion in sector j – a term, that will play
a crucial role in the analysis below. Its inverse relationship to sectoral output
aptly illustrates how price dispersion decreases the amount of output available
for consumption for a given level of the labour index. Canzoneri at al. (2005)
relate the price dispersion to welfare losses by observing that the social planner,
in order to maximise consumption, would allocate production of differentiated
goods equally to all firms (because their weights in the consumption index are
equal). But since firms, due to nominal price rigidities, charge different prices
in the equilibrium, the Pareto efficient allocation is infeasible. Lower demands
for one good must be more than compensated by higher demands for other
goods (due to their imperfect substitutability) to achieve a given level of utility.
Higher sectoral output then implies higher demand for labour and correspond-
ingly greater disutility from labour. Analogously to the price and wage indices
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defined above, it can be shown that the price dispersion can be restated in a
computationally simpler form of
DPj,t = 
(
Pj,t−1
Pj,t
)−θ
DPj,t−1 + (1− )
(
P ∗j,t
Pj,t
)−θ
(3.23)
3.2.3 Equilibrium and parameterisation
The preceding subsections described the optimal behaviour of households and
firms and their mutual relationships. We are now ready to define the equilibrium
for the whole economy. It is defined as a set of allocations that includes the
aggregate and sectoral consumption bundles Ct and Cj,t and the labour indices
Lj,t, and a set of prices that includes the aggregate and sectoral price indices
Pt, Pj,t, wage indices Wj,t, prices and wages of those who can adjust them in
the given period, P ∗j,t and W
∗
j,t, and the marginal costs MCj,t so that, for a
given level of the nominal interest rate Rt set by the central bank and the
stochastic productivity processes (defined below), the following conditions hold
for all t ≥ 0:
1. households maximise consumption over time according to (3.12) and (3.13)
and set wages according to (3.14)
2. firms set prices according to (3.18) and (3.20)
3. the price and wage indices satisfy (3.3), (3.21) and (3.15)
4. sectoral outputs are given by the demand functions (3.2)
5. sectoral labour indexes follow from the aggregate resource constraints as
stated in (3.22) and (3.23)
6. markets clear, so that we have Yj,t = 2Cj,t for both sectors and Yt = 2Ct
at the aggregate level.
This system does not have a closed-form solution, nonetheless it can be iden-
tified by perturbing the deterministic equilibrium, in which the price and wage
inflation is zero and all variables take constant values over time. Description of
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how this system behaves in a vicinity of the deterministic equilibrium is a topic
of section 3.3.2. Before turning to the log-linear analysis though, a description
of the functional forms and parameter values used in the computations is due.
The following functions for the period utility functions of consumption and
leisure are assumed in the model:
U(Ct) =
C1−σt
1− σ
Vj(Lj,t) = κj
(1− Lj,t)1−χ
1− χ
Allowing the leisure preference parameter κj to differ across sectors, as e.g.
in Erceg and Levin (2006), greatly facilitates the derivation of the social welfare
function because it permits to consider the steady-state elasticity of substitution
in leisure identical across sectors. Different elasticities would bring about an
additional source of dissimilarity, which would obscure the results presented in
this chapter. For the sake of comparability, the above-referred study is also the
source of most of the parameters used here, in particular of σ, χ, θ and φ. The
structural parameters in the utility functions are set to σ = 2 and χ = 3 and
the shares of labour hours to leisure in the steady state are equal to 1/2 in
both sectors, which calibrates the weights of leisure in the utility function κj.
Next, in order to simplify interpretation of optimal targeting rules, the shares
of sectors in the aggregate output are equal to ψm = ψs = 0.5. The discount
rate β equals 0.99 implying that the steady-state real interest rate is 1.01% on
a quarterly basis or roughly 4% annually. Parameters θ = φ = 4 so that steady
state mark-ups are equal to 33%. Finally, the expected contractual duration of
prices and wages is four quarters (the parameters  and η are both equal to 0.75,
as in Erceg et al., 2000).
What remains to specify are the properties of stochastic innovations. Erceg
and Levin (2006) characterise them by means of bivariate AR(1) processes, which
allows the coefficients and standard errors to differ in both sectors. However,
since the strategy followed in this paper is to isolate the effects of different labour
intensities, the properties of shocks are assumed to be symmetric here. They
follow a bivariate first-order stochastic process At = 0.95At−1 + et, where et is
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an i.i.d. process with variances σ2m = σ
2
s = 0.0086
2, in line with the traditional
RBC literature, and corr (em, es) = 0.29, as in Erceg and Levin (2006). The
computational approach followed here is based on the estimation of variances
of certain variables included in the model, so only the properties of stochastic
processes matter, the particular draws of shocks are not relevant for the results.
3.3 Equilibrium of the log-linearised model
The linear-quadratic approach of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) to welfare
evaluation relies on the second-order Taylor-series approximation to the social
welfare function and first-order approximations to the structural equations of
the model that were derived in the previous section. This section outlines the
structural equations in their log-linear form while the derivation of the social
welfare function is postponed to section 3.4. The structural equations shown
here define how the system responds to small shocks that perturb the non-
stochastic equilibrium (small in the sense that first-order Taylor series expansion
still provides an accurate description of the system).
This section is divided into two parts: the first solves for the equilibrium
of the log-linear model in the case of fully flexible wages and prices, which
represents the Pareto efficient allocation in this model. The other section derives
the equations in the presence of nominal price and wage contracts.1
1In what follows, all nominal variables are rendered stationary by suitable transformations
so that wages and prices set in a given period are standardized by the corresponding sectoral
indices. The sectoral price and wage aggregates and the nominal interest rate are divided by
the aggregate price level. A percentage deviation of a variable Xt from its steady state value
X will be denoted with lower-case letters, e.g. xt, and represent a first-order approximation
to ln
(
Xt/X
)
. Superscripted variables, xn, denote the value of the variable x in the efficient
equilibrium and, finally, xˆ stands for the gap between the actual level of a variable and its
value in the efficient equilibrium, x− xn.
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3.3.1 Flexible price and wage equilibrium
Let us start with defining the two fundamental parameters of the log-linear
model: elasticity of marginal utility of consumption and elasticity of marginal
disutility of labour. The former is defined as ρ = −UCC
UC
C and the latter as
ω = VLL
VL
L. With the functional forms specified above it is evident that these
parameters are common to both sectors and are equal to σ and χ/2, respectively.
The weighted average of shocks in the economy is awt = ψmam,t + ψsas,t and,
finally, the common denominator of the equations that follow, Λ, is equal to
ω + ρ + (1− ρ) (ψmαm + ψsαs). With these definitions in mind, we can now
proceed to characterise the solution of the efficient equilibrium.
The real interest rate, as defined by the Euler equation (3.12, 3.13), is given
by int = Etρ
(
ynt+1 − ynt
)
. Socially optimal allocation requires that the impacts
of productivity shocks are spread equally among households in both sectors, so
that their consumption (and the aggregate output) corresponds to
ynt = ((1 + ω)/Λ) a
w
t (3.24)
Similarly, the social planner then distributes the given change in production
equally among all workers, therefore also the labour indices (and individual hours
of work) respond only to the economy-wide average of shocks
lnj,t = ((1− ρ)/Λ) awt
These two equations imply that the marginal rate of substitution is equalized
across sectors, hence also real wages (normalized by the aggregate price level)
respond identically: mrsnj,t = w
n
j,t = ((ω + ρ)/Λ) a
w
t . However, the social plan-
ner recognizes that the marginal product of labour, defined in (3.20), is steeper
in the capital-intensive sector and allocates the sectoral outputs accordingly.
mp lnj,t = aj,t − αj ((1− ρ)/Λ) awt (3.25)
ynj,t = (1− αj) ((1− ρ)/Λ) awt + aj,t (3.26)
At this place it is appropriate to foreshadow that the steeper slope of the
marginal product in manufacturing will, with rigid prices, motivate the desire of
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the central bank to fight inflation in the manufacturing sector more emphatically
than in services because a given change of output will require greater response
of the labour index there. We will return to this point in section 3.4. For future
reference, relative prices are defined as prel,t = pm,t−ps,t and reflect the different
response of sectoral outputs:
pnrel,t = (αm − αs) ((1− ρ)/Λ) awt − (am,t − as,t) (3.27)
This concludes the description of the efficient equilibrium of the model and
we now turn to the case of asynchronous price and wage adjustments.
3.3.2 Equilibrium with nominal rigidities
The demand side of the model is characterized by the inter-temporal IS equation
yˆt = Etyˆt+1 − 1
ρ
(it − Etpit+1 − int ) (3.28)
derived from the first-order conditions of the household problem. This equation
embodies the negative dependence of the output gap, yˆ on the gap between
the real interest rate and its counterpart in the efficient equilibrium, where the
latter summarizes how current and expected future productivity shocks affect
the course of the economy. Some authors refer to it from this reason as the
“Wicksellian” natural rate of interest (e.g., Woodford, 2003). By solving the
equation forward one can further show that the central bank can stabilise the
aggregate output gap by adjusting the expected path of the real interest rate
along the natural interest rate.
The supply block of the dynamic model consists of two sets of behavioural
equations that characterise the price setting and wage setting processes, respec-
tively, and several definitions describing the linkages between sectoral price and
wage indices.
First, log-linearising the firms’ price setting equation, (3.18), together with
the sectoral price index, (3.21), yields
pij,t = µp (wj,t −mp lj,t − pj,t) + Etβpij,t+1 (3.29)
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where the parameter µp =
1−

(1− β) determines the degree of inflation per-
sistence. The marginal product of labour follows from the definition in (3.20),
where the labour index is replaced using the sectoral resource constraint (3.22).
Substituting in the solutions from the efficient equilibrium and re-arranging (as
in Erceg et al., 2000), it is possible to show that the marginal product is nega-
tively related to the sectoral output gap (the last term at the right-hand side).
To conserve space, the following expression uses signed shares of sectoral con-
sumption bundles in the consumption aggregator ψ˜m = ψm and ψ˜s = −ψs.
mp lj,t = w
n
j,t − pnj,t −
αj
1− αj
(
yˆt − ψ˜j pˆrel,t
)
(3.30)
By following a similar strategy, from the wage-setting relationship (3.14) and
the wage index (3.15) it is possible to derive a dynamic equation that determines
sectoral wage inflation as a function of expected wage inflation and the deviations
of the marginal rate of substitution from the real wage.
piwj,t = µw (mrsj,t − wj,t) + Etβpiwj,t+1 (3.31)
where the coefficient of inertia in wage inflation µw =
1−η
η
(1 + ωφ) (1− ηβ)
plays a similar role as µp above. The marginal rate of substitution is obtained
by log-linearising (3.16)
mrsj,t = w
n
j,t +
(
ω
1− αj + ρ
)
yˆt − ψ˜j
(
ω
1− αj
)
pˆrel,t (3.32)
where one can observe that lower substitutability in consumption (higher ρ)
makes the marginal rate of substitution relatively more responsive to the aggre-
gate output gap than to changes in relative prices. This will become important
in section 3.4, where it will counteract the central bank’s willingness to allow
extensive deviations in outputs across sectors.
Finally, the following relationships between prices, wages and the correspond-
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ing inflation rates close the system of log-linear equations:
pij,t = pj,t + pit − pj,t−1 (3.33)
piwj,t = wj,t + pit − wj,t−1 (3.34)
pˆrel,t = pm,t − ps,t − pnrel,t (3.35)
0 = ψmpm,t + ψsps,t (3.36)
where the first two equations simply follow from the definitions of inflation rates
(normalized by the aggregate price index), the third equation defines the relative
price gap and the final relationship is a log-linear version of the aggregate price
index (3.3). Assuming that the path of the nominal interest rate is exogenously
determined by the central bank, the equations reported in this section form a
block of fourteen linear equations that fully describe the dynamic response of
all endogenous variables to productivity shocks.
3.4 Nominal rigidities and welfare
This section turns to the main question addressed in this paper: what is the
optimal policy of the central bank when sectors do not employ identical factor
proportions and how can it be implemented? To answer the first question,
a social welfare function is derived to see what variables should the central
bank stabilize, while the issue of its successful implementation will be discussed
subsequently by means of numerical simulations.
I follow here the work of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), who showed how
to derive a social welfare function from microeconomic foundations and how to
compare it to its ideal value achievable in an economy without nominal fric-
tions. Furthermore, the derivation of the welfare criterion consistent with this
particular model makes use of strategies outlined in Aoki (2001), Benigno (2004)
and Erceg et al. (2000). To start with, the social welfare is defined as an un-
conditional expected value of the sum of households’ discounted utility. Taking
unconditional expectations is needed in order to take into account all possible
histories of shocks that may have occurred prior to date t. Before taking the
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unconditional expectations, the sum of discounted (time t-conditional) utilities
is denoted SWt
SWt = Et
∞∑
i=0
βi
[
2U(Ct+i) +
∫ 1
0
V (Lm,t+i (h)) dh+
∫ 1
0
V (Ls,t+i (h)) dh
]
(3.37)
The criterion that the monetary authority wishes to maximise is defined as
SW = E (SWt − SW nt ). The law of iterated expectations then implies that
this problem is equivalent to minimizing the period average utility losses from
deviating from the efficient equilibrium.
The Rotemberg and Woodford’s method proceeds by taking second-order
Taylor expansions of each element in (3.37), which allows one to describe the
welfare criterion exclusively as a function of second moments of the aggregate
and sectoral output gaps and the price and wage inflation rates in each sector.2
E ŜW = γy (1− ρ) var yˆ − ψm γy 1 + ω
1− αm var yˆm − ψs γy
1 + ω
1− αs var yˆs
− γp
1− αm var pim −
γp
1− αs var pis − γw var pi
w
m − γw var piws (3.38)
plus terms independent of policy and the third- and higher-order terms. This
welfare function implies that there are two kinds of variables to be taken into
account by the social planner – the gaps between the actual and the optimal
levels of output and sectoral measures of nominal variability – both of which
are rooted in the presence of nominal rigidities but hint at different aspects of
welfare losses.3
The former term, variance of output gaps, reflects the costs of output devi-
ations from its efficient level and points to the objective of the social planner
to respond to sector-specific shocks so that resources are allocated efficiently
across sectors. Note that the presence of output gaps indicates that a complete
2The reader is kindly referred to the Appendix for details of the derivation. The coefficients
in (3.38) are defined as follows: γy = UCC, γp = −VLL  θ2(1−)2 and γw = −VLL
η φ (1+ω φ)
2 (1−η)2 .
Note that all these terms are positive and ρ is larger than one, so that all terms in (3.38) enter
with a negative sign.
3For an excellent exposition of the role played by each element of welfare functions of this
sort see Woodford (2003).
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stabilisation of the level of output is undesirable; the central bank aims, instead,
at establishing such changes in output that would prevail under flexible prices
(recall that nominal rigidities are the only source of distortions in this economy).
The other set of variables that appear in (3.38) is related to the price and
wage dispersion, which are caused by asynchronous nominal adjustment. These
terms give rise to welfare losses even if the central bank manages to close the out-
put gap completely because the lags in nominal adjustment generate inefficient
dispersion of demands for individual goods and workers. Because goods and
workers are imperfect substitutes, as can be seen from the aggregators (3.4) and
(3.7), disproportional consumption of the individual goods results in spending
more resources to produce a given level of the consumption bundle (and simi-
larly for workers). To see this, notice that all the goods carry equal weight in
the aggregator, hence the optimal allocation would require each firm to produce
an equal amount of its own good.
3.4.1 Role of sectoral labour intensities
The first question addressed in this paper – Should the central bank respond to
differences in labour intensities across sector? – can be answered by inspecting
the social welfare function (3.38). The answer is “Yes”, labour intensity affects
the weights of some, not all though, of the sector-specific variables in the welfare
function. The weight of sector j variables is inversely related to labour intensity
1 − αj, which means that the social planner can, other things equal, achieve a
greater increase in the average utility by pursuing a policy that is biased towards
lowering the variance in the capital-intensive sector. In order to understand the
nature of the task faced by the central bank, let us inspect the origin of the
sector-specific weights: the marginal product of labour.
As was already indicated in section 3.3.1, the slope (in absolute value) of the
marginal product increases with capital intensity (falls with labour intensity),
which implies that production of an additional unit of output makes capital-
intensive firms hire more labour than labour-intensive firms. When demand for
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output increases, a capital-intensive firm needs to hire relatively more workers
compared with the labour-intensive firm, where the marginal product is flatter,
since the marginal product decreases faster with each additional worker hired.
This logic carries through also to the sectoral level. Rewriting the production
function of an individual firm using the sectoral labour demand Lj =
∫
Lj (f) df
as Yj (f) = Aj (Kj/Lj)
αj Lj (f), it is possible to show that the sectoral labour
demand is given by4
lj =
1
1− αj (yj − aj) +
1
2 θ (1− αj)varfyj (f) (3.39)
The first term on the right-hand side reflects the average amount of the labour
index employed by firms in a sector, which is also the origin of the sectoral
output-gap coefficients in the social welfare function, as shown in the Appendix.
The other term on the right-hand side represents the extra labour cost caused
by asynchronous price adjustment and imperfect substitutability among goods:
if the demands for individual goods differ across firms then the total amount
of output produced by individual firms (hence the total amount of labour) has
to increase in order to meet a given demand for the sectoral output. The vari-
ance term can be directly related to price dispersion if one recalls that the de-
mand for an individual good is given by (3.5), which implies that varfyj (f) =
θ2varfpj (f). Erceg et al. (2000) then show that
E varfpj (f) =

(1− )2 var pij
which gives rise to the price-inflation term in the social welfare function (3.38).
While the inefficiencies generated by contractual price setting depend on the
relative labour-intensity of production, it is not the case with dispersion in in-
dividual labour hours that arises from wage rigidities. The key relationship in
this regard is the log-linearised version of the sectoral labour aggregate (3.7), by
means of which the fictitious labour agency aggregates the individual hours of
work into the composite requested by firms. Relating it to the aggregate amount
4This is equation (3.53) in the Appendix.
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of hours supplied by households, Nj =
∫
Lj (h) dh, it is possible to derive the
following relationship5
nj = lj +
1
2φ
varhlj (h) (3.40)
which shows that in order to produce a given amount of the labour index lj
households have to provide more labour hours in total when the individual
labour supplies differ from each other. The non-degenerate dispersion in in-
dividual labour hours is, similarly to the price rigidities described above, caused
by asynchronous wage adjustment and by the fact that individual workers are
imperfect substitutes to each other (with greater elasticity of substitution be-
tween individual workers, φ, the inefficiencies decrease). With regard to the
questions addressed in this paper, it is important to notice that these ineffi-
ciencies are independent of the labour-intensity because the way workers are
assembled to the final labour composite is common to both sectors.
3.4.2 Role of aggregate output gap
The results obtained so far imply that the output gap and the price inflation in
manufacturing receive a higher weight in the social welfare function (3.38) com-
pared with their counterparts in services. However, the welfare function also
shows that the central bank faces a trade-off when it tries to stabilise one sector
(around its efficient level) more intensively at the expense of greater volatility
in the other sector. Mathematically, the trade-off is represented by the appear-
ance of the aggregate output gap (square) in the welfare function (before taking
unconditional expectations the variance term is in fact equal to yˆ2). Since the
weights of sectoral outputs in the aggregate output correspond to ψm and ψs
and, most notably, are not affected by the respective labour intensities, mini-
mizing this term would require to minimise both sectoral output gaps according
to the weights they receive in the aggregate.
Intuitively, this term originates in households’ relative willingness to adjust
their labour supply and to substitute in consumption between the sectoral bun-
5This is equation (3.48) in the Appendix.
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dles. While it may be optimal for the central bank to push manufacturing always
closer to its efficient level (to reduce the inefficiencies resulting from output vari-
ability), these efforts are limited on the consumers’ side by the elasticity of their
preferences. The latter is dictated by parameters ρ and ω, which are inversely
related to elasticities of utility from consumption and labour, respectively. In
particular, if ρ is relatively high (consumption is inelastic), consumers would pre-
fer the central bank to respond equivalently to shock in both sectors to achieve
a more balanced path of the aggregate consumption. Similarly, if ω is relatively
low (labour supply is elastic), the fact that output dispersion requires greater
shifts in the labour index hurts workers relatively less and thus the central bank
is motivated to reduce output losses in both sectors in a more balanced way.
The desire to smooth the relative discrepancies between sectoral outputs is
also magnified by the presence of wage rigidities. When workers are contractually
committed to provide labour hours at the existing wage rate, adjustment to the
efficient level of output lasts longer since the pull of the wealth effect, which
would otherwise push demands in desired direction, is mitigated. Thus the
welfare maximizing central bank has an additional incentive to curb the output
gaps equally in both sectors to accelerate the aggregate output gap adjustment
(by making the covariance between the output gaps more negative).
3.4.3 Optimal monetary policy
To solve for the optimal policy I follow the Lagrangean approach of Woodford
(2003) which consists in maximizing the social welfare function (3.38), the exact
form of which is given in the Appendix, subject to the behavioural constraints
presented in section 3.3.2. Next, I use the Anderson-Moore (1983) algorithm
to map the system of the dynamic first-order conditions into an auto-regressive
form, the stationarity of which then allows to iterate the system to obtain vari-
ances of all variables and, in the final step, to evaluate the social welfare function.
Solving for an explicit policy rule, such as the Taylor rule, is not feasible here,
similarly as in Benigno (2004).
3. OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY 123
Figure 3.1: Variances of sectoral variables in the optimum: αs = 0.10, αm varies
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Note: The figure shows socially-optimal variances of sectoral output gaps y, rates of price
inflation pi and wage inflation pi_w for different values of capital intensity in manufacturing,
αm. All variances are expressed relative to those achieved when αm = αs = 0.1.
The logic behind the optimal response of the central bank is demonstrated in
Figures 3.1 and 3.2. The figures show the socially-optimal variances of sectoral
variables (output gaps and inflation) that feature in the social welfare function.
Figure 3.1 refers to the baseline scenario with an equal degree of price and wage
rigidities, while Figure 3.2 shows the outcome with relatively low wage rigidity.
All variances are expressed relative to the case when labour intensity is equal
across sectors.
Both figures confirm the intuition described above: as capital intensity in
manufacturing increases (labour intensity falls) it is optimal to reduce variance
of the output gap in that sector (denoted as y_m) at the cost of higher variability
of the output gap in services, y_s.
With relatively flexible wages, one can observe that the central bank is able to
respond more emphatically to shocks in manufacturing to a much greater extent
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Figure 3.2: Variances of sectoral variables in the optimum with less rigid wages
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Note: The figure shows socially-optimal variances of sectoral output gaps y, rates of price
inflation pi and wage inflation pi_w for different values of capital intensity in manufacturing,
αm. All variances are expressed relative to those achieved when αm = αs = 0.1.
than the in the baseline scenario because the adjustment is faster overall. Hence,
the trade-off between reducing the inefficient output dispersion in manufacturing
and increasing the output gap overall (due to lower covariance between the two
sectors) is less difficult.
As indicated above, the optimal plan is defined only implicitly as an auto-
regressive stochastic process of the endogenous variables (and of the correspond-
ing Lagrange multipliers). Such a prescription is, however, of limited value for
the central bank that seeks to communicate its policy to general public in the
hope to influence its inflation expectations. In the next section I will there-
fore analyze the optimal actions of the monetary authority assuming that it can
commit itself to a credible inflation target.
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3.4.4 Implications for inflation targeting
Having explored the socially optimal plan for this economy, we will now investi-
gate how the optimal plan can be implemented by means of inflation targeting.
In particular, the question is: What is the optimal inflation target in an econ-
omy with nominal frictions and two sectors that differ in the extent of capital
and labour intensity?
The choice of inflation targeting is grounded in the fact that rules based
particularly on inflation do not require the knowledge of the efficient levels of
output or relative prices, as would be the case if one wanted to target measures
including also output gaps. In particular, we will inspect the performance of
following inflation targeting rule
δ pim + (1− δ) pis = 0
where we are interested in finding the optimal value of δ that allows the cen-
tral bank to come as close as possible to the optimal plan. This rule can be
understood as an implicit form of an interest-rate rule that requires the central
bank to increase the interest rate when the weighted index of inflation increases
above zero and vice versa, to decrease the nominal interest rate if the index
drops below zero. To the extent that price inflation reflects output variability,
as explained in section 3.4.1, it is also an indirect measure of shocks that hit the
given sector. If prices and wages were fully flexible, the relative prices would
immediately adjust to reflect the relative productivities in both sectors and the
resulting demand shift would bring about the efficient structure (and level) of
production.
With rigid prices (and wages), the central bank can, by adjusting the nominal
interest rate, attempt to stimulate aggregate demand in order to mimic the
efficient relative price adjustment so that the economy starts shifting toward the
efficient level of output. Furthermore, by adjusting the sectoral weights in the
targeted inflation index it is able to systematically assign higher or lower priority
to shocks (and output gaps) in a particular sector. Complete stabilisation of
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Figure 3.3: Optimal weight of manufacturing (δ) in the inflation target
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Note: The figure shows the weight of inflation in the capital-intensive sector in the central
bank’s optimal inflation target. Optimal weights are reported for selected values of capi-
tal intensity in services as (different lines) and corresponding ranges of capital intensity in
manufacturing am (along the horizontal axis).
both output gaps in an economy, where both sectors exhibit nominal rigidities,
is nevertheless infeasible (as shown in Benigno, 2004).
Figure 3.3 reports the optimal weights of manufacturing, δ, for selected values
of capital intensity in services (αs ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3}) and corresponding ranges of
capital intensities in manufacturing defined as αm ∈ (αs, αs + 0.5).
The key observation that emerges from the figure is that, as the capital inten-
sity in manufacturing increases, the optimal inflation index assigns higher weight
to manufacturing, which effectively means that the central bank prioritizes clos-
ing of the output gap in that sector. The intuition for this result goes back to
the discussion in the section 3.4.1: the central bank tries to reduce inefficiencies
resulting from output dispersion, the extent of which is greater in the relatively
more capital-intensive sector. Note that if sectors do not differ in factor intensi-
ties, the figure shows that their respective weights in the inflation index exactly
correspond to their weights in the consumption basket: ψm = ψs = 0.5 (for
comparative purposes I will henceforward refer to such a policy as a symmetric
targeting).
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Figure 3.4: Elements of welfare on the way to the optimal policy
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Note: The figure shows variances of sectoral output gaps y, rates of price inflation pi and
wage inflation pi_w for different values of the share δ of the capital-intensive sector in central
bank’s inflation target. Capital intensities are αs = 0.10 and αm = 0.25, for which the optimal
weight of manufacturing is 0.6. All variances are expressed relative to those achieved under a
symmetric inflation target (δ = 0.5).
The outcome from following the optimal targeting policy on the variables
included in the social welfare function is demonstrated in Figure 3.4, which
confirms that, as the central bank starts moving away from the symmetric tar-
geting rule (δ = ψm) toward the optimal one, the output dispersion (i.e., price
inflation) in manufacturing decreases and the output of this sectors follows its
efficient path more closely. On the other hand, the output gap and, most sig-
nificantly, the dispersion of individual outputs (price inflation) in services takes
the opposite course.
Two other results follow from Figure 3.3. First, as the capital intensity of
services increases as well, the extent of the optimal bias toward manufacturing
decreases (this is represented by a shift to a lower curve in the figure).6 With
6Mathematically, this can be seen from the relative weights of yˆm and yˆs in the objective
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greater use of capital in the economy overall, the marginal product of labour
becomes steeper in both sectors and the preference to fight inefficiencies in only
one of the sectors becomes less obvious (notice that the relationship between
output dispersion and its cost in terms of the additional increase in the labour
index in (3.39) is non-linear as well).
Finally, one can observe that the size of the optimal bias increases in a con-
cave fashion and, in fact, as the difference in the capital intensity across sectors
becomes large it eventually reverses its trend. This finding can be understood
in the light of the central bank’s trade-off indicated in section 3.4.2. As capital-
intensity in manufacturing increases the central bank is tempted to close the
manufacturing output gap with greater force than in services. However, by do-
ing so the central bank allows the productivity shocks in services to take their
natural course, which would eventually result in larger volatility of consumption
and output overall. This can be tolerated only to the extent given by consumers’
preferences. Should it become excessively volatile, the welfare maximizing cen-
tral bank starts responding to the sectoral shocks in a more balanced way.
This trade-off also stands behind the poor performance of the inflation tar-
geting rule in the quantitative sense. Table 3.1 compares the performance of
the optimal inflation target to the symmetric one. The measure of performance
compares the size of dead-weight losses eliminated under the targeting policy
with optimal weights δ∗ to the improvement achievable by implementing the
fully optimal plan. Following Benigno (2004), it is constructed as follows
ŜW (δ∗)− ŜW (δ = 1/2)
ŜW
∗ − ŜW (δ = 1/2)
It turns out that while targeting the optimal inflation measure represents an
improvement compared to the symmetric target, the magnitude of welfare gains
is rather small compared to that achievable under the fully optimal policy. This
finding accords with conclusions of Erceg and Levin (2006), who inspect the per-
formance of inflation targeting in a two-sectors economy, where sectors differ in
function: ψmγy 1+ω1−αm /ψsγy
1+ω
1−αs =
1−αs
1−αm . Higher αs decreases the relative weight of the
output gap in manufacturing.
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Table 3.1: Welfare improvement with the optimal inflation target
αs αm δ
∗ Performance
(%)
0.10 0.30 0.58 2.7
0.10 0.45 0.59 2.8
0.20 0.40 0.54 1.0
0.20 0.55 0.55 1.1
0.30 0.50 0.53 0.3
0.30 0.65 0.53 0.3
the durability of their products. Neither in their model nor in the present paper
is the inflation targeting policy able to achieve a substantial welfare improve-
ment because it fails to move aggregate output sufficiently close to the efficient
outcome.
3.5 Conclusions
The issue of optimal inflation targeting has received considerable interest in
recent literature. Continuing in the research agenda of Rotemberg and Wood-
ford (1997), who first implemented a micro-founded social welfare function to
monetary theory, I study the optimal behaviour of the central bank in a two-
sector economy with nominal rigidities, where sectors differ in the extent of their
labour intensity. By deriving the social welfare function, I find that the opti-
mal inflation to target in such an economy is systematically biased toward the
capital-intensive sector.
The source of this bias is traced back to differences in the slope of the marginal
product of labour in the two sectors. Nominal rigidities and limited substitu-
tability across individual goods generate dispersion in the equilibrium amounts
of output and labour, which is a source of welfare losses compared with the
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efficient outcome. Steeper marginal product of labour in manufacturing gives
rise to higher efficiency costs of the fluctuations in the labour input in this sec-
tor. These findings complement those of Benigno (2004) and Erceg and Levin
(2006) who conclude that the optimal measure of inflation to target should be
biased toward the sector that exhibits a higher degree of nominal rigidities and
a relatively more durable output, respectively. This paper focuses at highly
realistic differences on the production side of the economy and examines their
implications for the design of the optimal monetary policy.
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3.A Appendix
This section shows how to derive the social welfare function (3.38). It builds
on strategies suggested in Aoki (2001), Benigno (2004) and Erceg et al. (2000),
whose features the present model makes use of. Let us start with the average
welfare of households in period t (compare to 3.37), where the time subscripts
are dropped for ease of notation.
SW = 2U(C) +
∫ 1
0
V (Lm (h)) dh+
∫ 1
0
V (Ls (h)) dh (3.41)
Implicit in the equation is the assumption of complete markets, which allows
households to choose identical level of consumption in all states of nature. I
will now take a second-order Taylor expansion of each element in the welfare
criterion as is shown by the following preliminary example. The utility function
can be approximated up to the second order by
U(C) = U(C) + UC
(
C − C)+ 1
2
UCC
(
C − C)2 + o (‖ξ‖3)
Noting that C can be written as Cec, where c = ln
(
C/C
)
and approximating
it up to the second order by C
(
1 + c+ 1
2
c2
)
+ o (‖ξ‖3), we can rewrite (3.A) as
U(C) = U(C) + UCC
(
c+
1
2
c2
)
+
1
2
UCCC
2
c2 + o
(‖ξ‖3)
or, equivalently
U(C) = UCC
(
c+
1
2
c2
)
+
1
2
UCCC
2
c2 + t.i.p.+ o
(‖ξ‖3)
where the term t.i.p. refers to terms independent of policy and the last term on
the right-hand side includes all terms of order three and higher (henceforth I will
neglect both of them). With these steps in mind and recalling that aggregate
consumption (C = Y/2) is related to sectoral outputs according to (3.1), which
I repeat here for convenience:
C =
Cψmm C
ψs
s
(ψm)
ψm (ψs)
ψs
(3.42)
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we can approximate the utility from consumption as follows.
U(Y/2) = UYmY m
(
ym +
1
2
y2m
)
+
1
2
UYmYmY
2
my
2
m
+ UYsY s
(
ys +
1
2
y2s
)
+
1
2
UYsYsY
2
sy
2
s (3.43)
+ UYmYsY mY symys
Furthermore, by differentiating (3.42) and setting ρ = −UCCC/UC one can
prove the following relationships
UYjY j = ψjUCC
UYmYmY
2
m = −ψmUCC (ρψm + ψs) (3.44)
UYsYsY
2
s = −ψsUCC (ρψs + ψm)
UYmYsY mY s = ψmψsUCC (1− ρ)
that will be used shortly.
The second order approximation of each of the average labour supplies in
(3.41) takes the form of
EhV (Lj (h)) = VLL
(
Ehlj (h) +
1
2
Ehlj (h)
2
)
+
1
2
VLLL
2
Ehlj (h)
2 (3.45)
where Eh denotes an average over households in a sector. This step makes use
of the fact that steady-state labour supply is equal in both sectors. To eliminate
the quadratic terms in lh we can use the definition of variance,
Ehlj (h)
2 = varhlj (h) + (Ehlj (h))
2 (3.46)
and the terms in expectations can be obtained from the equality of the aggregate
labour hours supplied by workers to the employment agency and the aggregate
demand by firms. The former is given by the labour index (3.7)
Lj ≡
[∫ 1
0
Lj (h)
φ−1
φ dh
] φ
φ−1
which in the second order approximation reads as
lj = Ehlj (h) +
1
2
φ− 1
φ
varhlj (h) (3.47)
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Denoting Nj the total amount of hours actually supplied by households, Nj =∫
Lj (h) dh, which can be approximated as nj = Ehlj (h)+
1
2
varhlj (h), the above
equation can be equivalently restated as
nj = lj +
1
2φ
varhlj (h) (3.48)
which is equation (3.40) in the main text. The left hand side of (3.47), the
percentage change of the sectoral labour supply, must be in the equilibrium equal
to the percentage change of the sectoral labour demand, which aggregates the
labour demands of individual firms: Lj =
∫
Lj (f) df , or in the linear-quadratic
approximation,
lj = Ef lj (f) +
1
2
varf lj (f) (3.49)
Next, I make use of the production function to eliminate Ef lj (f). Recall that
all firms in a sector employ identical capital-labour ratio, so that we can write
Yj (f) = Aj (Kj/Lj)
αj Lj (f) or in the log-linear form: yj (f) = aj −αjlj + lj (f)
because the sectoral level of capital is fixed. From here we have the following
relationships
Ef lj (f) = Efyj (f)− aj + αjlj (3.50)
varf lj (f) = varfyj (f) (3.51)
Next, we employ the definition of the sectoral output, (3.4),
Yj ≡
[∫
Yj (f)
θ−1
θ df
] θ
θ−1
which can be approximated by
yj = Efyj (f) +
1
2
θ − 1
θ
varfyj (f) (3.52)
Solving for Efyj (f) from (3.52) and substituting it in (3.50), and then using
it together with (3.51) in the sectoral labour demand equation, (3.49), we have
equation (3.39), which appears in the main text:
lj =
1
1− αj (yj − aj) +
1
2 θ (1− αj)varfyj (f) (3.53)
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Finally, equalizing the sectoral labour supply (3.47) and labour demand (3.53)
we can solve for Ehlj (h)
Ehlj (h) =
1
1− αj (yj − aj) +
1
2θ (1− αj) varfyj (f)−
1
2
φ− 1
φ
varhlj (h) (3.54)
We are now ready to return to the average disutility from labour. Substitute
first the first-order term of (3.54) in (3.46) and then use the result together with
(3.54) again in (3.45) and rearrange the terms to get
EhV (Lj (h)) = VLL
yj − aj
1− αj +
1
2
(
VLL
θ (1− αj) varfyj (f)
+
(
VLL
φ
+ VLLL
2
)
varhlj (h) +
(
VLL+ VLLL
2
)(yj − aj
1− αj
)2)
(3.55)
Before we proceed further it is useful to factor out VLL from the second
line and use the elasticity ω = VLLL/VL. Furthermore, the term VLL/ (1− αj)
can be then replaced by −2UYj Y j. This relationship follows from equalizing the
supply of sectoral output (in the steady-state), as given in (3.22), to the demand
for sectoral output from (3.2), where I made use of (3.20) to substitute for pj.
Solving for wages and substituting the resulting expression into the marginal
rate of substitution, (3.16), gives the desired relationship.
The next step consists in employing the definitions from (3.44) to simplify
(3.55) and (3.44) so that, after we substitute them back in (3.41), we have
SW
UCC
= ψmy
2
m − ψm (ρψm + ψs) y2m + ψsy2s − ψs (ρψs + ψm) y2s
+ 2ψmψs (1− ρ) ymys + 2ψmam + 2ψsas
− ψm 1 + ω
1− αm (ym − am)
2 − ψs 1 + ω
1− αs (ys − as)
2 (3.56)
− 1
θ
(ψmvarfym (f) + ψsvarfys (f))
−
(
1
φ
+ ω
)
((1− αm)ψmvarhlm (h) + (1− αs)ψsvarhls (h))
With some algebra and using the definition of the aggregate output from
(3.42), which in the log-linear form reads as y = ψmym + ψsys, the first three
lines of (3.56) can be simplified as follows
SW1−3
UCC
= (1− ρ) y2 − ψm 1 + ω
1− αm (ym − am)
2 − ψs 1 + ω
1− αs (ys − as)
2 (3.57)
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where I have neglected terms independent of output. Notice that an equivalent
relationship can be obtained for the case without nominal rigidities. Subtracting
the efficient solution from (3.57), expanding the squares, substituting for aj from
(3.26) and subsequently for aw from (3.24), this equation simplifies in
ŜW 1−3
UCC
= (1− ρ) yˆ2 − ψm 1 + ω
1− αm yˆ
2
m − ψs
1 + ω
1− αs yˆ
2
s (3.58)
where the terms with hat refer to output gaps, e.g. yˆ = y− yn. Lastly, from the
definition of the aggregate output and the demand curves (3.2) it is straight-
forward to derive the following relationships between the aggregate output gap
and the relative price gap (defined as pˆrel = prel − pnrel): yˆ = yˆm + ψspˆrel and
yˆ = yˆs − ψmpˆrel. Substituting these relationships in the equation above, it can
be equivalently expressed as
ŜW 1−3
UCC
= cg yˆ
2 + 2ψmψs
(
1 + ω
1− αm −
1 + ω
1− αs
)
yˆ pˆrel − ct pˆ2rel (3.59)
where
cg = (1− ρ)− (1 + ω)
(
ψm
1− αm +
ψs
1− αs
)
(3.60)
ct = ψmψs (1 + ω)
(
ψm
1− αs +
ψs
1− αm
)
Turning now to the last two rows in (3.56) we can rewrite the variance terms
as follows. First, from the demand functions (3.5) and (3.8) we have that
varhlj (h) = φ
2varhwj (h) and varfyj (f) = θ
2varfpj (f). Erceg et al. (2000)
show that
E varhwj (h) =
η
(1− η)2 var pi
w
j (3.61)
E varfpj (f) =

(1− )2 var pij (3.62)
Collecting the results of equation (3.58), taking unconditional expectations
(the proof that E yˆ2 = var yˆ can be found in Erceg at al., 2000), and adding the
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variance terms from (3.61) and (3.62), the social welfare function becomes
E ŜW
UCC
= (1− ρ) var yˆ − ψm 1 + ω
1− αm var yˆm − ψs
1 + ω
1− αs var yˆs
− θ
(1− )2 (ψm var pim + ψs var pis) (3.63)
− ηφ (1 + ωφ)
(1− η)2 (ψm (1− αm) var pi
w
m + ψs (1− αs) var piws )
or alternatively, which is equation (3.38) in the main text,
E ŜW = γy (1− ρ) var yˆ − ψm γy 1 + ω
1− αm var yˆm − ψs γy
1 + ω
1− αs var yˆs
− γp
1− αm var pim −
γp
1− αs var pis − γw var pi
w
m − γw var piws (3.64)
where the coefficients are defined as follows
γy = UCC γp = −VLL  θ
2 (1− )2 γw = −VLL
η φ (1 + ω φ)
2 (1− η)2 (3.65)
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